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Social movement theories have evolved rapidly during the latter half of the twentieth 
century, and they offer an enhanced understanding of the organizational dynamics in 
Hezbollah. Armed resistance theories have also evolved, and shed some light on the 
decision making process of the organization. These theoretical frameworks coalesce to 
show that Hezbollah’s resolute radical agenda was malleable as the situation changed. As 
the movement grew, it demonstrated the same concerns as all large groups. This thesis 
asks two important questions: why did Hezbollah moderate its political stance, and what 
lessons can we learn from this case study? 
This thesis analyses Lebanon’s Hezbollah from 1982 to 1992. The analysis 
centers on the evolution of the organization’s political program, and outlines a distinct 
shift in organizational goals. This thesis argues that Hezbollah shifted from a movement 
that was determined to establish a radical Islamist centered government to one that works 
within the Lebanese system. The motives behind the shift in political ideologies are 
important, because they offer options to those who seek to moderate radical political 
forces.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The story of Hezbollah1 is one of contradiction and controversy. Hezbollah is a 
militant organization, bent on the violent overthrow of the Lebanese government, and 
dedicated to the destruction of Israel.2 Since 1982, Hezbollah has conducted an armed 
resistance against the status quo and has attempted to protect the 27 percent Shi’a 
minority through violent means. The goal of the organization is to establish an Islamic 
republic to fix the societal ills that have plagued Lebanon since its inception. The identity 
of Shi’a within Lebanese society and the character of the sectarian government has given 
rise to a multitude of violent actions with far reaching consequences. Hezbollah uses 
unconventional tactics and terror to challenge the government and foster strong ties with 
Iran. 
Hezbollah began to explore new options in its resistance, and moved towards 
participation from within the established government after the 1989 Taif Agreement, 
which ended the Lebanese Civil War. After a protracted debate within the upper echelons 
of the group’s leadership, Hezbollah decided to participate in parliamentary elections. 
After some notional success, the footprint of the group became much larger, as they 
attempted to coop support from the population. Schools, hospitals and community 
organizations started to become a means of influence within the larger Lebanese society. 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Hezbollah began to focus more effort 
on its electoral program, moving into provincial and municipal elections. The practice of 
armed resistance persisted, but from 1992 to 2009, the preponderance of violence was 
used against Israel to the south, not internal enemies. In recent years, internal violence 
has made a resurgence, but it is has not reduced the prominence of Hezbollah’s electoral 
program.  
                                                 
1 There are other accepted ways to spell Hezbollah (Hizbullah, etc.), but this form is used for 
continuity’s sake. 
2 Excerpts from the English translation of “An Open Letter: The Hizbullah Program” in Joseph 
Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 39. 
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This thesis will seek to explain the establishment of Hezbollah’s electoral 
program, analyzing several potential variables to understand this new turn for the 
organization. The Shi’a identity mobilization in Lebanon offers an example of the 
creation of armed resistance groups. The history of Hezbollah as an organization is 
pertinent, as it shows the phases of development, and how the group has mobilized and 
evolved over the years. The dynamics of collective action, collective identity and social 
movement play a role in the study of Hezbollah’s electoral program. This thesis will ask 
whether organizational dynamics within Hezbollah caused a shift towards political 
participation. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The West and Israel characterize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Years of 
terror tactics against targets within Lebanon have shaped the perception of the group and 
have affected foreign views of the country as a whole. Despite many years of conflict, 
Hezbollah continues to thrive. It appears to be engrained into the Lebanese social and 
political landscape. The study of Hezbollah is often centered on religious extremism, yet 
few policy makers focus on the group dynamics, and how armed resistance groups 
continue to operate in the face of military, economic and political pressure. Hezbollah has 
evolved, and will most likely continue to do so. An important question then becomes: 
how do external political actors encourage an evolution towards continued political 
participation and non-violence? 
Hezbollah does not exist as a singularity. It combines the ideals of a multitude of 
different social actors. There are religious ideologues, political activists, armed Jihadi and 
various disaffected minorities. Hezbollah attempts to coopt various actors in order to 
bolster support for its Islamic version of governance. The diversity within the 
organization produces different programs in addition to violent struggle. In order to 
understand the actions of Hezbollah and to predict further policy formation, a 
comprehensive study is necessary to understand terrorist organization maturation. With a 
proper understanding of the history, organization, and group dynamics, external political 
actors could suppress violent means of resistance. 
 3
The decision to participate within the political process represented a dramatic 
shift in Hezbollah’s ideology. An understanding of the shift towards an electoral process 
will provide a framework for future studies in the field of terror group maturation. 
Furthermore, a study into group dynamics will demonstrate how policy makers can 
change an organization from the outside, and take an inclusive stance towards an 
origination bent on the destruction of established governments. In this case, the desired 
end result is political competition, not armed conflict. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The study of Hezbollah is often complicated by the rhetoric and the strong 
emotions that come with religious fights. In order to cut through the language of conflict, 
one must take a different approach when studying the political program. A journalistic 
approach is not sufficient to understand why Hezbollah has evolved over the years. The 
statements of the leadership, the Open Letter of 1985, and the results of debates simply 
serve as a history without analysis of the dynamics that are present. In many ways, the 
public statements of Hezbollah do not offer a better understanding of the organization. 
Rote recitation of group policy does not serve to analyze the underlying group dynamics 
present in the decision making process. This thesis sets out to address the question of 
why? Why do armed resistance groups decide to participate in politics? 
Social movement and collective identity theories offer better explanation for the 
evolution and maturation of terrorist organizations. Much work has been dedicated to the 
ideological tenets of Hezbollah, and it is easy to paint a picture of an organization that is 
immovable in creed and staunchly dedicated to a unitary goal. Yet this has not been the 
case historically. Organizations, whether violent or not, have many dynamics at play, and 
make important decisions for complicated reasons. The value of a strong constituency 
cannot be overstated, and Hezbollah is not exceptional in this context. Organizational 
survival is contingent on pleasing the largest number of possible supporters. In this thesis 
I will argue that the decision to participate in the political process was not the result of 
heavy-handed western tactics to force a change. Rather, the politics within the 
organization in the context of opportunities and constraints in the domestic environment 
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caused a change in the ideological stance, and demonstrates a resistance group’s desire to 
survive through any means. In short, I argue that Hezbollah’s Islamist ideology is 
secondary to the survival of the movement as a whole. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The identity of the Shi’a in Lebanon has shaped the development of armed 
resistance and political organizations. Augustus Richard Norton and Joseph Alagha 
demonstrate the political and social basis for the armed resistance of the Lebanese Shi’a. 
According to both authors, Amal, another Shi’a militant organization and Hezbollah are 
the result of years of disenfranchisement within the Lebanese political spectrum.3 
Furthermore, the corruption of the previous political bosses created an environment 
where more radical organizations could gather support. Norton and Alagha focus on the 
role of the Lebanese civil war in the development of militant Shi’ism, and outline the role 
that Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other organizations played 
during the twentieth century. These narratives offer an explanation for the rise in 
Hezbollah’s popularity, and how the organization learned from the mistakes of the past.4  
A comprehensive review of Hezbollah’s history is needed to explain the political 
environment that influenced the creation of the organization and to explain its generally 
accepted interests. A historical narrative will also bring to light the thematic elements 
throughout decades of organizational development. Augustus Richard Norton, in his 
work, Hezbollah: A Short History,5 succinctly brings many elements of the development 
of Hezbollah together. He demonstrates the value of the Shi’a identity in Lebanon, and 
how the manifestation of Hezbollah is the result of political and economic 
disenfranchisement. In The Hizbullah Complex, Amad Nizar Hamez furthers the 
argument that ideology has little to do with the success and flexibility seen throughout 
Hezbollah’s history. Social theories offer a more comprehensive analysis. Hamez states 
                                                 
3 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
Kindle edition. 
4 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History; Joseph Alagha, Shifts in Hizbollah’s Ideology: Religious 
Ideology, Political Ideology, Political Program (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004).  
5 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, loc 345. 
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that the study of Hezbollah should not be simply journalistic—it needs to be analytical, 
and to understand a group of ideologues, sometimes the religious identity needs to be 
sidelined. Scholars need to understand the group dynamics in play.6 Joseph Alagha 
continues with the thematic elements that Norton describes. In Shifts in Hezbollah’s 
Ideology: Religious Identity, Political Ideology, and Political Program,7 Alagha further 
demonstrates the identity of the Lebanese Shi’a, and describes the multifaceted character 
of the organization. Alagha and Norton describe an organization that was formed around 
the disparate political economy of Lebanon’s sectarian government. Furthermore, they 
accurately describe the evolutionary character of the organization and show that the 
interests within the leadership and consistency have shifted. Norton’s other work, Amal 
and the Shi’a Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon,8 shows the shift in Shi’a political identity 
during the early 1980s. He juxtaposes Hezbollah with Amal, the second leading Shi’a 
organization, and demonstrates the reasons for the rise of the former. Amal Saad-
Ghorayeb explains the rise of Hezbollah in his article: “Factors Conducive to the 
Politicization of the Lebanese Shi’a and the Emergence of Hezbollah.”9 The historical 
contexts of these narratives are less mired in rote classical history—they attempt to create 
a understanding of Hezbollah through modern historical social analysis.  
The dynamics of group association and collective action within Hezbollah are 
extremely complicated and fractured. In order to understand the policy of such an 
organization, considerable analysis is necessary. Social movement and armed resistance 
theory bring together various sociological schools to better understand why people 
organize collectively, who they choose as leaders, and how decisions are made for the 
body. For many theorists, the decision to participate within a social movement is made 
possible by a change in the political atmosphere. According to Sidney Tarrow, in Power 
in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, social actors who lack 
                                                 
6 Amad Nizar Hamzeh, In The Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 
ix–x.  
7 Alagha, Shifts in Hizbollah’s Ideology. 
8 Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi’a Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1987). 
9 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “Factors Conducive to the Politicization of the Lebanese Shi’a and the 
Emergence of Hezbollah,” Journal of Islamic Studies 14, no. 3 (2003): 273–307.  
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resources will come together to accomplish a goal that cannot be done with the existing 
pool of resources. In an attempt to coopt more members, the group then broadens their 
goals, and strategically uses cultural, social and economic incentives. The resulting ties 
between these members become intrinsically engrained within the organization, and 
become a motivation for continued resistance against the status quo. This resistance does 
not necessarily imply armed conflict, but instead shows that those without the resources 
necessary to mount a complicated opposition will look to others for support.10 
Tarrow further illustrates the importance of opportunity and constraint on growing 
social movements. Individuals will risk their rights and lives when the opportunities are 
present, and when constraints are mitigated. One of the most dangerous moments for a 
government is when they reform, since it opens opportunity for contentious political 
groups. Tarrow uses the former Soviet Union under Gorbachev as an example. The 
process of liberalization sparked a massive increase in political organizations, which 
eventually lead to the end of the established government. Tarrow describes the key 
dimensions for mobilization succinctly:  
(1) The opening of access for participation for new actors; (2) the evidence 
of political realignment in the polity; (3) the appearance of influential 
elites; (5) emerging splits within the elite; and (5) a decline in the state’s 
capacity or will to repress dissent.11 
To Tarrow, it was not simple discontentment that caused widespread social 
movements. It was the strong interpersonal ties between the members of these groups that 
reinforced their efforts for reform. Contentious political organizations do not survive 
simply by attempting to buck the established government. Organizers within the 
movement work to exploit the mistakes of the establishment, create a collective identity, 




                                                 
10 Sidey Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 74. 
11 Ibid., 76. 
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order to capitalize on their strengths. The struggle of a contentious political organization 
must be based within the cultural, social and religious identity of the proposed 
constituency.12 
Charles Kurzman’s social movement theory emphasizes the importance of 
opportunity. Established organizations recruit and act only when it is economically and 
structurally feasible to participate. The established government must either no longer 
have the willingness or the capacity to quell rising opposition movements. Kurzman takes 
his analysis further and demonstrates that established organizations offer the best 
opportunity for success when the constraints are removed. Religious organizations are the 
model for his analysis, since they have the existing power structure, collective identity, 
places to meet and a semblance of ideological standardization. Existing organizations, 
even without a political motive offer the best opportunity for organizers to gather mass 
support. The success of a resistance movement is dependent on their ability to build upon 
existing political and cultural organizations.13 
Francesca Polletta and James Jasper focus on collective identity within social 
movements. To Polletta and James, social movements are dependent on imagined and 
concrete communities. The perception of community must be present in order to bring 
different ideologies together, and the reasons for joining a collective are not the same for 
all members. For some, personal interest may overcome cultural or ideological 
imperatives. For others, it is the ideology of the group and surpasses the personal. It is the 
job of organizers to create an identity that overcomes all the boundaries present. For a 
social movement to work, a collective identity should be based on factors that cross 
cultural, social and economic motives.14 
While social movement theory may explain the motives for collective action in 
general terms, a large amount of research has also been dedicated to the study of armed 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 73–75.  
13 Charles Kurzman, “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A 
Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movements,” Mobilization: An International Journal 3, no 1, 
(1998), 23–4. 
14 Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” Annual 
Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 283–305. 
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resistance groups. Terrorist group dynamics can be broken into two distinctive schools of 
thought: the older view, instrumental, and the newer approach, the organizational. The 
instrumental approach has been used by scholars and policy makers for years, but has 
since fallen out of favor in the academic world. Since the 1970s, the organizational 
approach has had the priority. Both approaches explain the dynamics of terrorist 
organizations with an emphasis on different characteristics. 
William Bruce Cameron notes that the instrumental approach to the study of 
terrorist organizations is based upon the theories of human rationality. Instrumental 
scholars view all humans as rational actors, who use organizations as a means to further 
their own personal interests. All calculations are based on cost-benefit analysis of 
membership. Furthermore, these theories assume an insulated, unitary movement towards 
an ultimate goal. Personal ideology is overcome by the group as a whole, since it is the 
group that empowers its members.15 People with low self-esteem or social standing will 
continually seek organizations that further their own standing. 
The instrumental view also places a large importance on the leadership of a group. 
Charismatic leadership is the glue that holds a resistance group together. The members of 
the leadership then use symbols, emblems and legal frameworks to justify their position, 
which further cements group cohesion. William Bruce Cameron, in his landmark Modern 
Social Movements states the importance of a leaders justification: “Those in authority 
attempt to justify their rule over institutions by linking it, as if it were necessary 
consequence, with widely believed-in moral symbols, sacred emblems, [and] legal 
formulae.”16 
Martha Crenshaw furthers the discussion of the instrumental approach by 
demonstrating the link between a group’s action and their ideology. One can assume a 
group’s intention from the policy and action, since the group operates as a unitary whole. 
The lack of dissent within the ranks of an organization is proof of the cohesion in 
                                                 
15 William Bruce Cameron, Modern Social Movements (New York: Random House, 1966), 1–10.  
16 Ibid., 19. 
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ideology. Furthermore, this cohesion can temper the actions of a group, since they may 
lose possible support for engaging in activities that would alienate their members.17 
The instrumental approach to the study of terrorist organizations was the 
predominant theory within the study of social movements until the 1970s. Groups were 
seen as homogenous, held together by a common goal, ideology and charismatic leader. 
Resistance is the goal of the organization, and participation within the electoral system 
represents a failure in the organization, as well as a de facto recognition of the legitimacy 
of the current government.18 
The organizational approach began to take form in the 1970s, and attempted to fill 
the logical gaps in the instrumental view. According the organizational view19 
revolutionary organizations are not simply a homogenous group. Members bring their 
own interest, ideology, and faith into the debate. Organizations and their leaders must 
offer a large and diverse set of services to the constituency in order to ensure cohesion. 
Jeffrey Pfeffer and Geral Salanick, in The External Control of Organizations A Resource 
Dependence Perspective, argue that models of organizations rarely show that they 
operate as a unitary whole. An organization’s behavior is dependent on the individual 
ideologies, and the interaction between actors determines policy.20 
The organizational approach examines the internal dynamics of a resistance 
group, and attempts to understand the constantly evolving policy and stance of the 
leadership and constituency. Older organizations show the evolution that occurs when 
they fail to meet their stated objectives. Leaders that have an understanding of the 
internal politics of their organizations can more quickly adapt policy to suit a multitude of 
                                                 
17 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David Rapoport 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 15. 
18 Cynthia L. Irvin, Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque 
Country (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 6. 
19 Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism,” 27. 
20 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salanick, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 36. 
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different interests. Group policy is the result of a struggle within the group to find an 
ideological middle ground, which is used to ensure movement survival. 21  
The organizational approach offers more options to external policy makers. If the 
group is not seen as an ideologically homogenous, outside entities can weaken the 
position of the resistance group by offering different incentives. This approach assumes 
an inherent weakness within the cohesion of terrorist organizations.22 
In 1992, after 18 years without elections, the Lebanese people returned to the 
polls. The 1989 Taif Agreement laid the groundwork for greater political participation 
across religious confessions. Hezbollah decided to participate in parliamentary elections 
and made a distinct move towards participation within the Lebanese system. Joseph 
Alagha, in Shifts in Hezbollah’s Ideology outlines the development of Hezbollah’s 
political program from 1985 to the present day. Alagha analyses the Open Letter of 1985, 
as well as the various speeches, statements and works of Hezbollah’s leaders. He shows 
that the decision to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections had an ideological 
basis that spanned the history of the organization, and that Islamist organizations view 
political change from the top as a religious duty.23 Alagha uses primary sources to form 
his opinion of Hezbollah’s political ideology and uses a very straightforward approach to 
explain the ideological tenets that lead to greater political participation. In his next 
chapter, he analyses the discourse between Hezbollah’s leaders and what they used to 
justify their new ideological position. Alagha breaks down the debates in the period 
leading up to the 1992 election and states that there were four key issues on the table: (1) 
legitimacy of the current government; (2) abandonment of previous ideals; (3) the role of 
interests outside the norm; (4) the priorities of the party in the system. He then breaks 
down how all these problems were discussed, and how the leadership justified their 
actions.24 
                                                 
21 Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism,” 21–25. 
22 Ibid., 26. 
23 Alagha, Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, 120–124.  
24 Ibid. 
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Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, in In the Path of Hizbullah, states that Hezbollah’s move 
towards political pragmatism is the result of a calculated cost-benefit analysis. He argues 
that pressure from the U.S. and Syria was the main factors that caused political 
participation. Hezbollah was working to resolve public relations problems and to attempt 
to legitimize its position in the Lebanese political system. Hamzeh views Hezbollah as a 
unitary, rational organization that makes decisions according to circumstances. Richard 
Norton in Hezbollah: A Short History takes an opposite approach, and shows the 
fractures between the upper leaders of the party. In this context, Norton offers a view of 
the group that is more open to analysis through application of social movement theory.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research for this thesis will entail a historical study of Hezbollah, from its 
roots to the present day. The Lebanese confessional government has fostered an 
environment of competition and civil war. The Shi’a identity in Lebanon forms the basis 
for an understanding of the organization. A specific emphasis on the political ideology of 
the Shi’a is necessary in order to more effectively analyze the group interactions that 
formed policy. The religious ideology cannot be ignored, but in this context is not as 
important to understanding policy changes. A plethora of historical narratives exist which 
explain the roots of Hezbollah and how religious, social and political identity have 
shaped the group.  
A study into the theories of social movement, collective identity, and armed 
resistance are necessary to understand the dynamics behind Hezbollah’s policy 
formation. Significant research has been dedicated to the public statements that formed 
an ideological basis for political participation, but the underlying dynamics between 
members of the group has not been significantly studied. This thesis will explore the 
theoretical studies that explain the evolution and maturation of all social movements, and 
how the leadership and constituency interact to create change.  
 12
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II. THE CONFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF 
POLITICAL SHI’ISM 
A. THE NATIONAL PACT AND THE CONFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
The story of modern day Lebanon begins with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 
1916. This agreement set about the creation of a government that would relegate the 
Shi’a population in Lebanon to the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum. Great 
Britain and France used this agreement as a contingency for the predicted collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire. These two countries expected to come out of the war the victors, and 
needed an apparatus to distribute their claims throughout the Middle East. In this treaty, 
France was given the area of Greater Syria, which included the modern day countries of 
Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Jordan. The areas closest to the Mediterranean Sea would be 
under direct French control, with colonial administration running the daily operations and 
governance. In 1920, the French government used its mandate to establish Greater 
Lebanon, a wholly separate entity from Syrian territory. The establishment of this distinct 
colonial holding was for various socio-political goals. First, it was part of an effort to 
thwart the growing Arab independence movement that had its in Damascus. It was easier 
to control two distinct states with different religious interests. Second, this area held some 
of the most important farmland and resources in the Arab world, and held many of the 
important shipping ports on the Mediterranean. Third, in the French colonial mindset, the 
number of Maronite Christians in the area obligated the European power to protect and 
control the daily workings of the government. In 1926, the new Lebanese state created a 
constitution under French advisement and elected Charles Debbas, a Greek Orthodox as 
the first president of the colonial holding. One of the most important actions of the 
colonial government was to conduct a census in 1932, which would be used to administer 
the differing religious confessions. The results of this census would dictate the later 
system of government, and would create an environment that was advantageous to the 
Maronite Christians. This system would also ensure an environment that would be 
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disproportionately harmful to the Shi’a population.25 Results of the census showed the 
Maronites with 30 percent of the population, with the Sunni Muslims with 20 percent and 
the Shi’a with 18 percent.26  
After the formation of the new Greater Lebanon, the three main religious 
confessions were initially optimistic, since this new political entity afforded a large 
amount of control over domestic politics and protected sovereignty from external 
influence. Internally, the Shi’a initially supported the measures to create a separate 
Lebanon, since it separated their confessional from the Syrian political system and the 
Arab independence movement. This consolidated power for the Shi’a and afforded a 
greater amount of autonomy within a smaller nation. Joseph Alagha, a Lebanese social 
scientist states, “Under no other circumstance would the Shi’ite zu’ama (political bosses) 
aspire to play a prominent political role.”27 Contemporary western scholars and 
government figures also lauded the efforts of the French in setting up the confessional 
system of government. They saw it as a means of establishing a sovereign government 
with different religious traditions. The confessional government was the pertri dish where 
sovereignty, nationalism and religion would clash, and where theorists could test their 
models for governance. As Augustus Richard Norton noted the opinion of western 
scholars in his book on Amal: “It is our contention that the Lebanese approach, while not 
wholly adequate and not exportable in toto, has much to offer other states confronting 
serious problems of ethnic, religious and racial conflict.”28 The optimism that was 
initially expressed would be dashed through the formation of agreements that undermined 
the power of the Shi’a community.29  
According to Norton, who studies the Lebanese Shi’a extensively, infighting 
between the various religious groups continued in Greater Lebanon, as each religion 
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strived to maintain some semblance of political dominance. In addition, the 
demographics of Lebanon continued to change, which undermined the results of the 1932 
census. This demographic shift would not be addressed or acknowledged by the elite until 
later in the twentieth century. The stresses of the Second World War strained France and 
its colonial holdings. As a result, an agreement had to be achieved between the 
constituent parties. The modern state of Lebanon declared its independence from the 
French in 1943, with the French army finally leaving in 1945. The defining political 
agreement in the Lebanese state system was the national pact, a verbal agreement 
between the three largest religious communities in Lebanon. The Maronite Christians, 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims agreed to control the new modern state of Lebanon by 
confessional, with each religion given a proportional amount of power over the political 
spectrum. The Maronites inherited the highest position of authority, the presidency, Sunni 
Muslims were afforded the premiership, and the Shi’a were given the speakership of the 
parliament.30  
The confessional system of government that emerged from the National Pact 
organized each religion into sectarian political communities, each with their own power 
to appoint representatives and bureaucrats into the national government. The highest 
national posts were awarded to the three largest confessions, the Maronites, Sunnis and 
Shi’a. The data used to organize these communities came out of the 1932 census, where 
the results are known to be inaccurate and dubious. The French, who had conducted the 
census, counted Maronties in the majority and vastly under counted the Sunni and Shi’a 
populations.31 This was the last concerted effort by any entity to gain a handle on the 
demographics of Lebanon.32 As a result, the confessional government underrepresented 
the Shi’a and they had very little influence over the political system. The political, 
economic and social disenfranchisement of the Shi’a in Lebanon created and  
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environment that was rich for the establishment of political and militant organizations. 
The evolution of the Shi’a social, economic, and political landscape will be detailed 
further in this chapter.  
B. SHI’A SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS  
The disenfranchisement of the Shi’a in Lebanon can be traced back to Ottoman 
rule. From 1516 to 1922, the Shi’a population in the Levantine lost large amounts of land 
in the face of expanding Druze and Maronite populations. The economic viability of the 
population was consistently threatened without any recourse from protecting central 
government. When Shi’ism became the official state religion of the Safavid Empire, the 
Ottomans became increasingly suspicious of its Shi’a inhabitants. What followed were 
years of conflict between the empire, local inhabitants, and the Shi’a. The Ottomans 
tacitly supported the subjugation of the Shi’a over suspicions that they were loyal to a 
competing power.33 The Shi’a were unable to form their own community under the millet 
system, and their religious leaders were conscripted into the army during times of war. 
The Sunni Ottomans saw a threat in their own borders and reacted accordingly; taking 
land, life and freedom from the Shi’a population in the Levantine.34  
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Shi’a community continued its history 
of marginalization in the politics of greater Lebanon. The French were determined to 
establish a separate entity from the Syrian territory in order to protect the Maronite 
Christian population. The problem with this task was that there was a large contingent of 
Shi’a Muslims in the south that was opposed to the idea of Maronite rule. This tension 
boiled over in 1919, when Shi’a and Maronite militias clashed in a series of small battles. 
The French used this as an opportunity to support their Maronite partners, and crush the 
fledgling Shi’a resistance movement. The short-lived resistance was eventually crushed, 
and the Shi’a were forced to take a backseat in the formation of the new Lebanese 
government in 1920. This action also cemented the identity of the Shi’a in the minds of 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 9–10. 
34 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, loc: 239. 
 17
the western observers who assisted in the creation of the confessional government.35 
From 1920, any political mobilization by the Shi’a was extremely difficult, and seen as a 
danger to the established leadership. 
The 1932 census established the Shi’a community as the third largest in Lebanon. 
What this failed to account for was the growth of the community, and the lower standard 
of living within Shi’a territories. During the twentieth century, the Shi’a population 
growth has outpaced all other confessions. The average Shi’a family in the 1970s had 
seven children, where a Maronite family only had four.36 The natural growth of the 
population had little to no effect on the relevance of the Shi’a in politics. As Augustus 
Richard Norton states, “By any of the standard measures of socioeconomic status, the 
Shiites were the most deprived community in Lebanon.”37 In 1971, the average income 
for a Lebanese family was 6,247 Lebanese pounds. The average Shi’a income was 4,532 
L£. In terms of education, 50 percent of Shi’a had no formalized schooling, which was 
high considering the national average was only 20 percent.38 In terms of development, 
Southern Lebanon had the fewest roads, sewage facilities, schools and hospitals. Only the 
larger population centers could be considered modern by any stretch of the imagination.39 
According to Norton, few Shi’a owned land, with most opting for a system of 
sharecropping that paid a pittance. For those who owned land, they could not earn a 
living on the legal goods that they sold to the state, and as a result, many turned to illicit 
trafficking in goods such as poppies and hashish. To further exacerbate the problem with 
land and farming, the Palestinians in the south were a source for cheap and reliable labor. 
The wars in Israel and the Palestinian territory caused a massive migration into Southern 
Lebanon, with the PLO operating out of the area for several years. The Palestinians 
conducted operations from Lebanon since the 1950s, and as a result, Israel has had a 
military presence in Beirut and South Lebanon. Thousands of Lebanese Shi’a were 
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displaced in the clashes between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Many displaced 
Lebanese citizens, mostly young men, were forced to leave the country in search of 
fortunes abroad in Africa, Gulf countries and the United States.40  
C. THE ROLE OF THE ZU’AMA PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
MODERN POLITICIZED SHI’ISM. 
During the first 30 years of Lebanese history, it would be difficult to identify a 
unitary Shi’a community.41 The zu’ama, or traditional political patrons, dominated the 
Shi’a political landscape. Their power derived from the old Ottoman system of tax-
farming, where local elites held the legal authority to levy taxes in their own area. In the 
post-World War I era, these local elites consolidated their power by differentiating 
between the Shi’a and external religious confessions. Furthermore, each elite had his own 
portfolio of interests that may or may not have been contiguous with the other zu’ama. 
The result of this was a highly fractured political framework within the Shi’a community. 
It was these old local forces that coopted the confessional government, and used the 
structure to further their own ambitions. Control was maintained through traditional 
patronage networks, which had been built over years of interaction. These bosses 
maintained a delicate network of alliances, which combined many different traditions 
within the Shi’a community. Indeed, it would be difficult to identify a unitary community 
until the late 1960s.42  
As in the Ottoman system, the zu’ama enjoyed many of the material benefits of 
their position within society without affording their constituents any real services. 
Money, labor and votes continued to flow upward, with little in return to the local 
community. The services that were provided were not out of some sense of a legal right, 
but simply a return for tribute rendered. Corruption was the standard, not the exception. 
Bribes were the principal means of getting services from the state, and all services flowed 
through the local political boss. Where religious leaders were concerned, the shi’a ulema 
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were beholden to the zu’ama for all money and material benefits. Very few religious 
leaders had a means to support themselves or their flock. As a result, there was not a 
tradition of political involvement from the clergy. The ulema were unable to challenge 
the authority of the political leadership, which was in stark contrast to the later movement 
in Iran.43 
The zu’ama operated with impunity prior to the establishment of politicized 
shi’sm, and would stand as an example of the problems in the decadent past. The 
movements that came later in the twentieth century would point to the excess of the 
zu’ama as an example of what was wrong with the previous system.44 
D. THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL SHI’ISM 
By the 1960s, the political power of the zu’ama was waning for several reasons. 
The growing Lebanese state was increasingly adept at providing basic services to 
Christian and Sunni constituents. The Shi’a community observed this dynamic, and 
began to see the position of the zu’ama as increasingly irrelevant. People knew that there 
was a means to procure services without offering a tribute to a powerful family. Lebanon 
as whole was undergoing significant socioeconomic changes that brought to light the 
disparity between religious confessions. Shi’a were gradually getting their education, 
travelling abroad, and viewing the socioeconomic disparity. Furthermore, years of 
conflict brought no real change or reform from the traditional elites. The general 
population was looking for a new cadre of leaders to provide the protection that was 
needed in their communities.  
Simple demographics spelled a need for change in the Shi’a community. 
Observers understood the true nature of the population, even though an official census 
had not been conducted since 1932. By 1960, the Shi’a constituted the second largest 
confessional group, but had not gained any real rights within the confessional 
government. In 1972, Shi’a represented the largest confession, with over 1 million. This 
population represented 30 percent of all religions and represented the plurality of all 
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Lebanese inhabitants.45 These demographic changes would have widespread effects. The 
parliament prior to the civil war had 19 seats for Shi’a, and 30 for Maronite Christians.46 
These numbers were pinned to the 1932 figures and the National Pact of 1943. Had 
proportional change been made to the parliament, 10 more seats would be given to the 
Shi’a, with the Maronites losing the same amount. Furthermore, these demographic 
changes would challenge the Sunni majority in Muslim seats.47 
Between 1943 and 1963, there was a 146 percent rise in urban population, with 
the Shi’a as the largest and fastest growing urban community.48 Lack of opportunity in 
the south, as well as conflict with the Palestinians caused a mass exodus from the 
previous rural work that had defined Shi’a life. The urbanization of the Shi’a continued to 
rise even after this period. From 1960 to 1980, the percentage of total labor employed in 
the agricultural sector fell from 38 to 11 percent.49 These displaced workers turned to the 
service industry in urban centers. Furthermore, those who maintained their land began to 
feel the crunch of ever-stagnant crop prices, and they turned to secondary sources of 
income as a supplement. External migration increased as noted before, with as much as 
25 percent of the available Shi’a workforce leaving Lebanon. This force would become 
extremely important to the future development of Shi’a politics. The crucible of urban 
living, and the strong communal ties between Lebanese expatriates would provide the 
manpower necessary for large-scale political movement.  
The confessional system of government made mobilization a simple task. The 
movement of the Shi’a into urban centers did not spell the end of the identity. The Shi’a 
internal émigrés did not successfully merge into their new society, but instead maintained 
their old communal ties in a new setting. Even if politically minded Shi’a wanted to 
participate in municipal governance, the confessional system made any work close to 
impossible. Instead, these Shi’a communities remained insular; they provided for each 
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other in the face of government unwillingness and ineptitude. This urban population, 
unable to integrate, also had greater access to media, education and literacy training 
programs. Gradually, they became more aware of the disparity between religions. 
The zu’ama remained in the countryside, and continued to lose their grip on the 
political leanings of the community as a whole. The urban population began to organize 
itself around secular parties that ran candidates against the traditional leaders, who had 
proven themselves corrupt and unable to provide the necessary services. An increasing 
individualistic voice was apparent in the urban population, and they seemed to have little 
to no connection with tradition. As Norton states in his book on Shi’a politics, “Political 
institutions are conditioned by tradition and culture, but they do not persist only because 
they are traditional.”50 Over time, and with education, the Shi’a had broken the ties to the 
traditionally powerful families, and filled the vacuum with a multitude of political 
parties.51 
E. MUSA AL-SADR AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE SHI’A 
The 1960s and 70s marked a change in the consciousness of the Lebanese Shi’a. 
Now free from the old political leadership, the newly urban and organized population was 
looking for a new leader that could fight for greater political rights. The environment was 
ripe for recruitment of the disaffected population that was economically and politically 
marginalized by their own government. Several political parties rose in power, but one is 
seen as the ideological ancestor to modern Shi’a political mobilization: Amal. Musa Al-
Sadr, an Iranian national, would become one of the most important political figures in 
Lebanese history. 
Musa Al-Sadr was born in 1928 in Qum, Iran. Al-Sadr was the son of a prominent 
cleric, and was educated in Najaf, Iraq. A significant part of his upbringing was 
concerned with Shi’a traditions, even though he had planned on a secular career early in 
life.52 Al-Sadr moved to Lebanon in 1958, and began to organize a multitude of 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 33. 
51 Norton, Amal and the Shi’a, 36; Hamzeh, In the Path of Hezbollah, 16. 
52 Alagha, Shifts in Hezbollah’s Ideology, 26. 
 22
community programs in Southern Lebanon. Throughout the next few years, he gained a 
significant following in the Shi’a community, marrying a Lebanese woman, and gaining 
citizenship. Many scholars have shown that his involvement in the community during this 
time was extremely important and influential. He did not necessarily create a political 
consciousness in the Shi’a community, but brought a new life to the idea that the 
community should mobilize together in order to made concrete gains. Al-Sadr inserted 
himself into the already existing familial, political and social clubs, and worked from 
within them to gain a larger constituency.53 
Al-Sadr was one of the first community leaders to look above the fractured Shi’a 
community. He understood the power that could come from a united front. Even though 
al-Sadr was Iranian, he was quickly accepted into the political and religious framework of 
the country. He continued to speak with a Persian accent, but learned to use Arabic in 
motivating and captivating ways—using the shared religious beliefs to unite the Shi’a 
community. He also consolidated many traditions in order to create a new consciousness 
within the Lebanese Shi’a, and a new power base for political action. Augustus Norton 
explains al-Sadr’s public statements succinctly: “Al-Sadr exhorted his followers not to 
accept their deprivation fatalistically; he believed that as long as his fellow Shi’i could 
speak out through their religion they could overcome their condition.”54 The means to 
overcoming economic and political deprivation were not through the political parties, or 
the old zu’ama. Religious unity and solidarity would save the Shi’a from their plight. 
Al-Sadr held several different ideologies, the characteristics of which many would 
not associate with political Shi’ism.55 Al-Sadr understood the concerns of the Maronite 
population, and that for peace the Christians should hold the highest post in the 
confessional system. He was not a revolutionary.56 He simply criticized the standing 
government for ignoring the south, and placing a disproportionate amount of money in 
Sunni and Christian neighborhoods. When it came to the Palestinians, al-Sadr had 
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sympathy for their plight, but more importantly, did not want the establishment of a new 
state in southern Lebanon. The PLO and al-Sadr were consistently at odds when it came 
to power broking in the south.57  
In 1978, Musa al-Sadr flew to Libya for a series of celebrations for Muammar 
Gaddafi. Al-Sadr never returned from this trip. At the time of his disappearance in 1978, 
al-Sadr was not the most important, nor the most powerful leader in the Shi’a community. 
Many who fought in the civil war joined other Shi’a militias, opting to stay away from 
Amal, the militant wing of al-Sadr’s movement. Al-Sadr succeeded with his words, 
community action, social programs, and his death. His efforts further weakened the 
position of the old political bosses and the secular political parties of the 1960s.58 The 
legacy of al-Sadr’s movement was in the means of mobilization. The social, political and 
religious programs would live on, and become the means for future organizations to 
coopt support from the Shi’a community. Furthermore, Amal, the militant wing of al-
Sadr’s organization, would live on and dominate the political landscape for years to 
come.59 
F. THE RISE OF AMAL 
According to Alagha, Amal existed is relative obscurity during the first years of 
the Lebanese civil war. Many fighters chose their militias around community lines, and 
did not join ranks with the larger movement. Amal’s membership situation changed 
around 1978 for several different reasons. First, the death of Musa al-Sadr caused an 
outrage in the Shi’a community, and worked as a recruitment call to his organization. 
Second, the Israeli invasion of 1978 forced many Shi’a into the large movement as a 
means of consolidating force in order to protect their land. Third, Iran began to see the 
value in supporting Shi’a political movements within Lebanon.60 Amal and the Iranian 
Revolutionary government maintained close ties, trading clerics, students and money. 
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Furthermore, Iran had sent several radical actors in order to change the character of the 
organization from a protecting entity to a radical, revolutionary organization.61  
Relations with the PLO in the south also contributed to the growing popularity of 
the Amal movement. Palestinian guerillas often used hard-handed attacks against Israeli 
targets from the southern cities and neighborhoods. This brought the Shi’a community 
into the crossfire between Israeli soldiers and PLO operatives. Public support for the PLO 
continued to fall as Israeli troops conducted several incursions into the south, displacing 
thousands of Shi’a. The Palestinians were increasingly seen as foreign occupiers, whose 
actions caused more trouble for the native population. Amal became the strongest and 
largest domestic force that stood opposed to the actions of the Palestinian fighters and 
Israeli occupation. 62 In later years, the complicated relationship with the PLO, Israel, and 
the local population would cause trouble for the effectiveness of the Amal movement, 
and these developments will be explained in Chapter III. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The story of Lebanon began with hopeful optimism in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The confessional government became the grand experiment to mix 
different religious communities together, and to share the power across confessions 
proportionally. The confessional government did not take into account the true size of the 
Shi’a population, and was not set up in a fashion that would change to accommodate 
demographic shifts. As a result, the confessional government ensured the political 
disenfranchisement of the Shi’a community. By the 1980s, the Shi’a community had 
moved from the third largest religious confessional to the largest, with no shift in internal 
representation. The Lebanese system of government supported the political 
disenfranchisement of the Shi’a population. 
The socio-economic status of the Shi’a in Lebanon also contributed to the 
development of political and militant organizations. Southern Lebanon had the highest 
rates of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy in the nation. Development money from 
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the central government was not provided to these areas due to a lack of political power. 
Furthermore, the zu’ama ensured they received their tributes from the population, and 
distributed meager public services. 
The 1960s marked an era of political change in the Shi’a community. Migration, 
unemployment, and other socio-economic factors led to a large increase in the Shi’a 
urban population. This new constituency became increasingly disconnected from their 
old political bosses, and the resulting political vacuum created an environment ripe for 
political parties. The nationalist, secular, and socialist parties were short lived, but 
demonstrated the value of political mobilization for the Shi’a as a community. 
Musa al-Sadr mobilized the Shi’a community around religious terms. Community 
based faith programs were the means to mobilize support for a growing and powerful 
Shi’a political movement. Al-Sadr looked past the fractures that existed in the political 
landscape, and saw the value in bringing them together as a challenge to the status quo. 
Amal evolved from relative obscurity to one of the most powerful and important actors in 
Lebanese politics. As the civil war and Israeli occupation raged, Amal was the 
organization that worked to protect the Shi’a community and coalesce concerns. 
The experience of the Shi’a in the latter half of the twentieth century set the stage 
for large political and militant organizations. By the 1980s, the Shi’a had grown in 
population size, had separated from their old political bosses, and organized as a distinct 
community with cohesive goals. This history set the stage for a new brand of ideology, 
which would be popularized by Hezbollah.  
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III. THE RISE OF HEZBOLLAH 
The 1960s marked the beginning of political Shi’ism, and the rise in Shi’a social 
consciousness. As the decade wore on, and as conflicts continued throughout Lebanon, 
these movements became the tools for community survival, not a means to further the 
Shi’a cause from within the system. The Lebanese civil war created an adversarial 
environment that contributed to the militancy of political Shi’ism. Political actors 
understood that social programs and debate from within the Lebanese government did not 
stop violence or the growing body count. Military necessity dictated a change in the 
character of Shi’a political organizations, and weakened the traditional secular political 
parties. As a result, the most powerful organizations at the end of the 1970s were those 
who mobilized the most fighters against threats to the Shi’a community. 63 
Amal emerged as the most powerful force for mobilizing Shi’a activism in the 
1970s. After reaching ascendency, the organization found itself with a large set of 
competing ideologies. Amal was established as a sectarian movement but became 
increasingly adept at manipulating the system from inside the confessional government. 
The goal as outlined in their political program was to cause a downfall of the established 
government, but in action, the leaders of Amal were consistently attempting to create a 
better share for the Shi’a population within the existing government structure. Amal also 
was determined to keep Lebanon as a separate political entity within the greater Arab and 
Shi’a worlds. The leadership did not subscribe to the more radical idea of a larger Islamic 
republic that encompassed other territories. Smaller movements within the organization 
became increasingly separatist, and moved away from the domestic arena. The internal 
struggle that came from ideological and political differences within the organization 
would give rise to a new brand of political Shi’ism, one that was much more rooted in the 
radical overthrow of the status quo, and which identified itself as a religious movement 
over all other factors. 64  
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By the early 1980s, the relationship between Amal and the PLO had reached a 
boiling point. The constant fights between the organizations caused many Shi’a in 
southern Lebanon to question the direction of their political movements, and the 
motivations of the prominent leaders. The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr further 
exacerbated problems, since the next two prominent leaders, Husayn al-Husayni and 
Nabih Berri, were not powerful or charismatic enough to coopt the necessary ideological 
support. Iran attempted to fill this gap in ideological leadership, through providing 
continued support to Amal, and fostering closer ties between the Lebanese Shi’a and the 
Ayatollah. This support did not stem the tide of dissatisfaction within Amal, and the shift 
away from the organization’s ideological stance.65 
The rise in Hezbollah’s popularity can be explained by several different trends in 
Shi’a politics during the 1980s. Amal had begun to weaken its position ideologically, and 
the infighting between the political idealists and religious fundamentalists caused a rift 
within the organization. The Israeli invasion and the constant clashes between Amal and 
the PLO created an environment where the Shi’a turned to Islamist parties for refuge and 
upward mobility. Israeli occupation sowed the seeds of discontent in the Shi’a 
community. Amal’s corruption and cooperation with the confessional government 
demonstrated many of the previous trends seen with the zu’ama, and Amal’s leaders were 
seen as capitulatory towards the forces that were working against the Shi’a community. 
The War of the Camps, which was a war between Amal, Hezbollah and the PLO in 
Palestinian refugee camps, furthered the rifts between Shi’a political actors, and 
Hezbollah came out of this era as the overall victor. The open letter of 1985 demonstrates 
the radical trends in political Shi’ism, and the overall discontent felt with Amal and other 
organizations. This document also outlines the radical ideology of Hezbollah from 1985 
to 1992.  
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE IDEOLOGICAL RIFT 
Amal in the late 1970s remained a Shi’a political movement without an overtly 
radical religious character. Specifically, Amal did not espouse many of the radical 
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policies that worked for the Iranians, nor did they attempt to export their revolution to 
other parts of the Shi’a world. The leadership was interested in creating a more equitable 
share of power within Lebanon, and did not espouse the interests of extraneous outside 
powers. Nabih Berri, the leader of the movement, attempted to continue with the legacy 
of Musa al-Sadr, and maintained a semblance of cooperation with the established 
Lebanese government. The moderate leaders of Amal tried to change the system from 
within, and understood the danger of playing with the fears of the Sunni and Maronite 
communities.66 As Norton states in his book on Amal, “Upon examination, it is clear that 
the political program—first enunciated in 1974—has been marked with a fair amount of 
clarity and a generous amount of pragmatism.”67 Furthermore, Amal publicly supported 
an independent Lebanon, even with the conflict that came with such a diverse mix of 
religious confessions. There was simply a struggle to create a better distribution of social 
services, and a more fluid means to create a better overall welfare within the Lebanese 
state. This view came out of an understanding that the status of the Shi’a would be 
greatly hurt by any break from the state, and that some modicum of benefit came from 
participation with the government.68 
After the success of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini’s government 
attempted to spread the revolution past its own borders to other Shi’a populations 
throughout the Middle East. The Iranian government established close ties with some of 
the most important leaders of Amal, and began to influence the ideological debate within 
the organization. Iranian political actors infiltrated Amal, and moved throughout the 
country spreading their more radical rhetoric as a counterweight to the more moderate, 
secular leaders. Within Amal, fractions began to form after the success of the Iranians. 
The ideological question of the day was whether to emulate the Iranians, by espousing a 
more radical religious message and calling for the downfall of the government, or to 
continue with the more moderate, secular and cooperative framework. This would be the 
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beginning of a rift that would challenge the established Shi’a political organization, and 
give rise to more radical manifestations of political Shi’ism.69 
B. CONFLICT BETWEEN AMAL AND PLO  
By the early 1980s, clashes between the PLO’s Fatah and Amal became 
commonplace. The international environment affected the relationship between Amal and 
the various political actors, and created a new power struggle between power centers. 
One reason for the friction was Amal’s cooperation with Iran, and the close ties that had 
been formed during the early 1980s. The PLO openly supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, 
and this contributed to the strain in relations between the two organizations. Furthermore, 
Syria saw Amal as a positive force against the strength of the PLO on Lebanon, and 
supported the movement with money, fighters and ideological support. Some of the most 
successful fighters in Amal were sent to various training camps in Syria, and came back 
to the front wearing military uniforms and with standard military hardware. The heavy-
handed tactics of the PLO began to wear on the weary local populations, and Amal stood 
as the largest organized force against Palestinian aggression.70 
The fight between the PLO and Amal was not simply out of an ideological gap. 
Fatah continued to operate against Amal and other Shi’a organizations when it felt that its 
preponderance of power in the south was threatened. These villages not only saw the loss 
of life in their militant population, but many were bombarded by artillery attacks. 
Augustus Norton, in his book on the Shi’a populations in the south, noted that fighting 
raged throughout 1981 and 1982 between Amal and Fatah, with bombardment of several 
city centers. Fighting would continue without pause and with growing intensity, with 
many fearing a larger civil war in the south between the Palestinians and native Shi’a.71 
In the south, the political character was becoming increasingly nationalistic in the face of 
PLO aggression. On the eve of the Israeli invasion, the southern Lebanese seemed to 
come to a consensus that their interests were being influenced by too many outside 
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powers. There was an overwhelming feeling that Lebanon was for the Lebanese, and that 
it was becoming increasingly difficult to control non-indigenous militants.72 
C. ISRAELI INVASION OF 1982 AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POLITICAL AND MILITANT SHI’ISM 
In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in an effort to remove the PLO and 
other Palestinian militants. Many in the Shi’a community welcomed the initial Israeli 
invasion, since it would break the power of the Palestinian fighters in the region.73 
Alagha states that, “Ironically, the Lebanese sector that suffered most from the 
Palestinian military activity in south Lebanon against Israel until 1982 was the Shi’ite 
population; the misery generated by the Palestinian presence in the South was so great 
that when the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) invaded in June 1982 the troops were showered 
with handfuls of rice.”74 The hopes for a quick, surgical operation to remove the 
Palestinians were dashed, as the IDF continued to occupy southern Lebanon for several 
years. This occupation would set the stage for greater conflict within the Shi’a 
population, and the radicalization of organizational messages. Indeed, even many in 
Israel see the continued occupation of Southern Lebanon as a mistake that precipitated 
greater violence and fanaticism. Two former Israeli Prime Ministers, Ehud Barak and 
Yitzah Rabin both went on record to say that the protracted occupation of Lebanese lands 
was a mistake, and that prompt withdrawal after crushing the PLO would have been a 
better policy. 75 
Amal fighters may have openly fought against Israeli soldiers in the south after 
protracted occupation, but at the beginning of 1982, many members provided intelligence 
and support to the IDF in order to crush the fida’iyin. Amal as an overall organization 
itself began to align against the Palestinians. Many in the Shi’a community saw this 
realignment as a tacit approval of the Israeli occupation in the South. The organization 
became more interested in protecting the native population than winning the ideological 
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war. Amal had become so opposed to the Palestinian presence that according to Norton, 
“Some leading figures even argued that they were in an objective alliance with Israel 
against Palestinian guerillas.”76 Furthermore, in the midst of an ongoing civil war, the 
senior leadership worked with the Lebanese government in order to garner support for 
their militant actions against Palestinian fighters in the south. In 1982 Nabih Berri 
decided to cooperate with the Lebanese government, which was unforgivable to the more 
radical members of the Amal movement. Many deemed Berri’s actions as fundamentally 
un-Islamic, and chose to separate themselves from the movement entirely. Berri 
continues his ideological stance as the Speaker of Parliament and the current head of the 
modern Amal movement. Furthermore, to many Amal had grown too large and began to 
exhibit the same patron-client relationship that marked the Shi’a experience with the old 
political bosses. Berri’s cooperation with the status quo and the large amount of money 
flowing through the organization smacked of corruption to many Shi’a.77 
In 1982, Amal’s internal debate came to a head during the Mustafa Shumran 
Congress. This was where the future character of the organization would be debated. On 
one side were the more moderate and secular leaders, personified by Nabih Berri. On the 
other side was Sayyid Hussein Musawi, who emerged as the leader of the faction of Amal 
that espoused the ideals of the Iranian revolution. In contrast to the moderates, this openly 
radical faction felt that success could only come with the establishment of an Islamic 
republic. They further felt that any capitulation to the established government was a 
failure, and contrary to Islamic teachings.78 Iran openly supported the more radical 
Islamist groups, providing the people, training and funding necessary. It was their support 
of these openly religious factions that helped to create what would become Hezbollah. 
Others within the Amal felt that the confessional system was an important characteristic 
of the Lebanese government, and that their role was to develop a more equitable share of  
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Shi’a power from within the system. The rift between the Islamists and the secularists 
would precipitate a disintegration of the Amal leadership, and the creation of more 
radical organizations.79 
D. HEZBOLLAH ARRIVES AND THE ROLE OF IRAN AND SYRIA 
Hezbollah emerged as early as 1982 out of the turbulent Shi’a political landscape 
and the ideological rift between moderate and radical members of Amal. The ideological 
basis was set, but the emergence of Hezbollah as a coherent organization did not occur 
until 1985. The core of Hezbollah’s initial leadership was young, dedicated and radical 
revolutionaries. Many had been involved in previous political organizations, and had 
separated from them due to what they felt was ideological weakness in moderation. 
Notable leaders such as Hasan Nasrallah, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi and Shaikh Subhi al-
Tufayli were all in their twenties and early thirties at the time of the Israeli invasion, and 
during the ideological rift in Amal. These young leaders used the weakness of previous 
movements as an example of corruption, and a catalyst to more radical action. 
Norton explains the emergence of Hezbollah succinctly: “Iran and Syria share 
credit for sponsoring these young revolutionaries, although Iran certainly played the 
leading role.”80 Iran enthusiastically supported this new organization as the manifestation 
of its goal to export the Islamic revolution around the world. Since the late 1970s Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards were operating within southern Lebanon, working to radicalize the 
message of political Shi’ism. Furthermore, they worked to remove some of the 
factionalism within the radical Islamic political movements. Many different organizations 
emerged after the Israeli invasion, but they seemed to be concerned with their respective 
provinces. Iranian money and effort universalized the Islamic revolutionary message to 
the Shi’a population.81 
Iranian immigrants have long been associated with the development of Lebanese 
political Shi’ism. Hezbollah represents one of their greatest successes. Musa al-Sadr, an 
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Iranian, is still seen as the ideological father of all Shi’a political movements, and his 
legacy continues to influence modern day discourse. Mustafa Shamron immigrated to 
Lebanon as early as 1951, and quickly established training camps for Shi’a militants. 
Amal and the Iraq’s Islamic al-Dawa Resistance Party militants both trained at his 
facilities, which created greater connection between Iranian and Lebanese militants. 
Shamron continued his support in the Shi’a community, working with al-Sadr to establish 
Amal, and helping to forge the doctrinal tenets of what would become Hezbollah. These 
immigrants provided the full spectrum of support, including religious, financial, 
organizational and military aid.82 If it were not for the support of Iran, Hezbollah would 
not exist as an organized entity today.  
For its part, Syria provided support for far less ideological reasons. Syria 
understood the value of an alliance with Iran, and wanted to continue its protracted 
struggle against the United States and Israel. Support for Hezbollah was the means to 
maintain ties between Damascus and Tehran. The Syrian role has remained decidedly 
ambiguous, since they continue to actively support Amal as well.83 
E. WAR OF THE CAMPS AND BUILDING HEZBOLLAH’S LEGITIMACY 
WITHIN THE SHI’A COMMUNITY 
In 1985, the IDF began to withdraw troops from several different areas in 
Southern Lebanon. In the Nabatiyeh and Tyre districts, Amal used this power vacuum to 
seize control, set up checkpoints, and commence attacks against Palestinian targets in the 
various refugee camps around Beruit and in the south. In May 1985, the situation began 
to further deteriorate, when Amal and some elements of the Lebanese army began to shell 
refugee camps and continue protracted attacks against PLO militants. According to Rami 
Siklawi:  
Statistical reports show that, ‘in Shatila alone, it had been reported that 
278 homes were destroyed partly or fully from the total of 406 homes  
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during that phase of the war of the camps; at Sabra, the number of the 
destroyed homes reached 95 percent from the total property that forms the 
Sabrah refugee camp.’84  
A brief peace conference in late 1985 would temporarily stop the fighting, but a 
steady stream of support from Syria would precipitate further conflict. Fights continued 
through 1986 with greater amounts of ferocity. By April 1987, over 50,000 Palestinians 
had been displaced, and the large contingent of Palestinian militants had been removed 
from Lebanon. The official end to the conflict came in May 1987, but the War of the 
Camps would have a lasting effect on the character of Amal and political Shi’ism. 
The War of the Camps further exacerbated the ideological rifts present in Amal. 
Ideological moderates within Amal saw the PLO as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and 
to their greater goal of reform within the government. As such, they positioned 
themselves firmly against any conciliation towards external powers. The concerns of the 
local population fell on deaf ears, as Amal continued to lose credibility in the Shi’a 
community, as the streets of the south continued to suffer under sectarian conflict. The 
more radical members began to identify with the plight of the Palestinians and supported 
their cause against Israeli aggression. Their concerns were supported by a growing 
radical political environment, and greater support from Iran. 
Hezbollah emerged as a powerful organization in the late 1980s because of their 
principled stance against the War of the Camps and an increased alliance with Iran. 
Palestinian resistance was never crushed in the south due to the concerted efforts of a 
growing number of radicals who were increasingly dissatisfied with the perceived 
ideological weakness of Amal. These disaffected Shi’a migrated towards Hezbollah with 
increasing frequency towards the end of the 1980s. Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein 
Fadallah echoed the concerns of the radical actors and openly supported Hezbollah’s 
resistance. The local population began to change in its stance and had its concerns 
justified by revered political and religious leaders. In both ideological and real terms,  
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Amal was losing the battle. According to many observers, by 1986 Hezbollah had 
reached parity with Amal, and by 1990, Hezbollah surpassed Amal in Beruit’s suburban 
areas.85  
F. THE OPEN LETTER OF 1985 AND THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF 
HEZBOLLAH PRIOR TO 1992 
Hezbollah’s political ideology prior to 1992 illustrates the radicalization of Shi’a 
politics that occurred during the mid-1980s. “The Hizbollah Program, an open letter to all 
the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World,” or as it is simply known, the Open Letter of 
1985, officially established Hezbollah as a working political entity.86 This document 
acted as the beginning manifesto for a movement that had is roots established as far back 
as 1982, and attempted to establish a concrete set of radical policies that would guide 
action in the future. The document spanned the gambit of all subjects, and called for 
economic, social, and political justice.87 The overall goal of this proclamation was to 
establish a separate set of radical goals for governance, and to tie Hezbollah with a global 
struggle for justice. Furthermore, the Open Letter stated that the Iranian revolution should 
serve as an example to all downtrodden peoples; that anything can be accomplished 
through faithful application of Islam. 88 
From the outset, Hezbollah rejected all notions of cooperation with the established 
Lebanese government. To work with the established government was fundamentally un-
Islamic, since the system did not afford proper justice to all constituents. Nabih Berri and 
the Amal leadership had come to accept some facets of the confessional system, and 
began to work from within the system. This was unacceptable to the new radical political 
actors. Amal was seen as similar to the old political bosses, corrupted by the system, and 
moving past the concerns of the Shi’a community.89 
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Hezbollah’s radical Islamist ideology in the Open Letter stressed the idea that the 
world is set in two different camps: the oppressors and the oppressed. The Third World, 
which included all Islamic countries, found itself in a constant state of disruption and 
disrepair due to the machinations of a small group of elites. The Open Letter calls out to 
those who were abused in the world, the downtrodden masses who suffered under the 
yoke of imperialism in one form or another. The call in the Open Letter was not simply to 
Islamic people, they clearly stated that all peoples, regardless of religion, were welcome 
in the movement. Hezbollah supported their involvement of non-Muslims due to the 
seeming parity between Quranic verses and liberation theology.90 Domestically, the 
oppressors in Lebanon were the Maronite Christians and their militant supporters. 
Internationally, the oppressors were all the developed countries of the world, including 
the U.S., Israel, and France.91 Furthermore, if one is oppressed and has the capacity to 
resist, they are called to act. Those without the capacity to resist due to extenuating 
circumstances are to be spared the retribution of Hezbollah, but those with capacity who 
do not resist are equated with the oppressors.92  
According to the Open Letter, the Islamic state is the only system of government 
that can offer the proper amount of justice, security and liberty. This is not to say that the 
Islamic state would be forced on all within Lebanon. Hezbollah believed that the people 
should be free to choose their own system of government through consensus and mutual 
agreement. Disbelievers are not compelled to believe in Islam, since their error is one of 
ignorance. With education, and experience, people would naturally move their 
preferences towards Islam as the guiding principal in governance.93 The establishment of 
an Islamic state in Lebanon would the choice of the people, and stood as distinctly 
different from the confessional system of government that was forced by colonial powers. 
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Maronite Christians are regarded as apostates and hypocrites in Hezbollah’s 
ideology, since they ruled Lebanon as oppressors, and did not offer justice to smaller. 
Political Maronism was also set apart from other Christian sects, since the others did not 
have the lion’s share of political power. It was Hezbollah’s duty to replace the existing 
power structure from the top down, and through force of arms if necessary. Only then 
could the oppressed people of Lebanon have the mandate to choose their own 
government, which of course would be Islamic in nature. Christians, Jews and other 
confessions would not be forced to covert; they need Islam in order to find their way 
towards a more just path. 94 
Hezbollah’s view on jihad reflects the ideological belief that mediation and 
cooperation are not the answer. The Open Letter clearly states that it is an obligation to 
all Muslims to fight political enemies, specifically political Maronties. The lesser jihad is 
the struggle against the enemies of Islam in Lebanon, and those who prevent the spread 
of an Islamic form of government. Nasrallah points to four specific purposes with the 
smaller jihad: (1) to defend the ideology and resources of Hezbollah (2) to strike at one of 
the oppressor’s strategic centers (3) to disrupt political Maronism, and (4) to safeguard 
progress made by Hezbollah.95 Hezbollah’s ideology made violence a viable and visible 
tool for believers. Violence is the means to resist the oppression that was brought by 
outside entities, and how the movement would legitimize itself. Furthermore, violence 
and martyrdom were not only allowed, but condoned as a necessity in the face of 
occupying enemies. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Political Shi’ism underwent a transformation during the 1970s and 80s. Amal 
emerged as a powerful political force, but was unable to quell the ideological rift that was 
forming in the Shi’a community. The success of the Iranian revolution demonstrated the 
value of radical ideology to many political actors. These actors also benefitted materially 
from the exportation of the Iranian revolutionary ideology, as a large influx of money, 
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men and weaponry poured into the country. Amal’s open hostility towards the PLO 
weakened their ideological stance. The Israeli invasion of 1982 only served to exacerbate 
the conflict, and Amal was forced to take an ideological stance; one that many Shi’a 
found reprehensible. Amal became associated with the greed, corruption and abuses of 
the old political bosses. Nabih Berri and the Amal leadership alienated many radical 
Shi’a by cooperating with the confessional government, and working with the IDF to 
break the PLO in the south. 
Hezbollah emerged in the 1980s as the voice of radical Islamic politics. 
Cooperation with the confessional government was no longer an option; a better future 
could only come through the dissolution of the confessional government, and the 
establishment of an Islamic republic. Western styles of governance, no matter their 
manifestation, were inherently unjust and imperialist. The Open Letter and the public 
statements of Hezbollah’s leadership until 1992 demonstrate a fundamental hostility 
towards the established system. The radical Islamist stance of Hezbollah in the mid to 
late 1980s demonstrated a fundamental unwillingness to participate in the political 
process. Furthermore, violence was openly condoned as a means to cause change, 
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IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF HEZBOLLAH’S ELECTORAL PROGRAM 
Hezbollah’s rise to power is a reflection of the radicalization in the Shi’a 
community during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The nationalist, secular political 
parties of the 1960s failed to understand the power that religion and community could 
play on the national stage, and the violence of the Civil War effectively killed any real 
chance of a secular party’s success. During the Civil War, the Shi’a community began to 
look inward as a means to consolidate power and protect their interests. Musa Al-Sadr 
and Amal used religion as a rallying cry and successfully shaped the narrative as a 
struggle against those outside the community. Amal built a strong, secular centered 
organization, but cooperation with the confessional government marked the beginning of 
the end. The shift away from Amal’s model demonstrated the Shi’a community’s 
unwillingness to cooperate with the established system, and that working with the 
Maronite government represented a betrayal. 
Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah continued to build their legitimacy on the 
battlefield. They stood against the persecution of the Shi’a community from other 
religious militias. Israel was one of the most powerful forces whose actions ultimately 
legitimized Hezbollah as a fighting force in the south. The government was wholly 
unable to protect Lebanese territory, and Hezbollah was the only force that was capable 
of resisting the occupation of Lebanese lands. The radical, militant stance of the 
organization resonated deeply with the Shi’a population, as innumerable tragedies 
marked daily life in Southern Lebanon. Violence strengthened Hezbollah’s stance against 
the status quo, since they were alone had the number of fighters necessary for effective 
resistance. From an ideological standpoint, the Open Letter of 1985 clearly demonstrated 
an unwillingness to compromise their ideology for a greater share of power within the 
Lebanese system. The only means to gain power was through resistance against the status 
quo, and the complete overhaul of the government structure. According to the prevailing 
ideology, cooperation was not the answer to the Shi’a community’s ills. The corruption 
of the government, controlled by a select group of elite Sunnis and Maronites, made it 
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practically impossible to work from within the system before 1991. Hezbollah’s role was 
to work from the outside, providing an Islamic alternative to what they saw was 
fundamentally unjust.  
The Taif Agreement of 1989 was the first successful attempt to end the 16-year-
old Civil War. The agreement changed the confessional system slightly. The Taif 
Agreement was the first acknowledgement of the demographic shifts that were occurring 
in Lebanon. In 1990, a new constitution was drafted. In it, the religious confessions 
would have a more equitable share of power within the central government. Specifically, 
the Maronite president was now politically accountable to the parliament, which enjoyed 
a large Sunni constituency.96 The Taif Agreement also worked to end the violence that 
had plagued the country for years. Militias were disbanded; they had to turn their 
weapons in to the Lebanese military and shut down their training centers. These 
organizations had to either disband completely or become political parties, not 
combatants. There was, however, one exception to this rule. In return for participating in 
the peace process, Hezbollah was allowed to continue its activities against the Israelis in 
the south. Armed resistance to Israel could now be framed as a national resistance, and 
not the activities of a terrorist organization.97  
In 1992, Hezbollah decided to offer candidates for Lebanon’s parliamentary 
elections. This decision seemed to be inconsistent with the previous political ideology as 
laid out by the Open Letter of 1985 and the statements of the leadership. Parliamentary 
participation marked a complete revocation of the previous refusal to cooperate with the 
Lebanese government. Hezbollah’s violent action and the principled stance against the 
government legitimized their early, more radical political program. The question then 
becomes: why did Hezbollah break with established policies and decide to run a political 
platform from within the confessional government?  
This chapter will analyze Hezbollah’s formation as a resistance group as 
background for the greater theoretical question. In order to gain a comprehensive 
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understanding behind the shift in political programs, several different social movement 
theoretical frameworks will be used. Social movement theories offer an explanation as to 
why people organize collectively, whom they choose as leaders, and how decisions are 
made for the body. Armed resistance organizations do not stand as unitary actors. They 
are a conglomerate of many different backgrounds, ideologies and interests. Hezbollah is 
no different. Policy is often the result of a debate between the members of the group, and 
the decisions made are a reflection of the group’s struggle to maintain ideological 
relevancy, legitimacy and purity. Furthermore, armed resistance groups have their own 
special dynamics that drive the formation of policy. The theories behind armed resistance 
movements will offer a greater insight into the decision-making apparatus in Hezbollah.  
A. WHY COLLECTIVE ACTION? 
Early protest theories attempted to explain why people come together and act 
collectively. While these arguments seemed persuasive, they often fell short when tested 
against the facts. Prior to the 1970s, academics worked to describe contentious political 
movements as groups of irrational, poor, social outcasts. They could not conceive of a 
group of rational protestors who would sustain action against institutions. 98 This bias 
against protestors is evident in these writings, where theorists attempted pseudo-
psychological diagnoses of people within protest movements. They assumed that 
emotional responses overrode logical concerns, and that grievances had an immediate 
causal link with protest. 99 Furthermore, these theories assumed that protests were 
naturally short lived, because the costs associated with collective action were too high to 
support sustainment. 
Social movement theory emerged as a counter argument against protest theory. 
These new analytical models worked to remove bias from the existing scholarship and 
analyze the true motives behind collective action. When members join a movement, there 
are a multitude of different reasons for initial and continued participation. They are not 
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the poor, uneducated, irrational actors that previous theories assumed. Recent scholarship 
demonstrates four important elements in social movement theory: (1) necessity, (2) 
political opportunities, (3) mobilizing structures, and (4) framing processes.100 
This section of the chapter will explore these elements to explain Hezbollah’s 
large public base of support, and why the organization continues to remain relevant to 
this day. Furthermore, these theories will shed light onto the organizational 
characteristics that led to a change in Hezbollah’s radical Islamist stance. 
1. Necessity  
One of the most simple but pervasive theories on social movement is that they 
stem out of necessity. When a group of people mobilizes, it is often due to a perceived 
threat or risk.101 For Hezbollah, it is easy to see why a group of Shi’a would come 
together for collective protection. The Civil War wrought unspeakable havoc on the 
country, with armed militias fighting incessantly. Incursions by the Israelis encouraged a 
mass outbreak of violence in the south, with Shi’a communities caught in the crossfire. 
The War of the Camps (1985—1988) allowed Hezbollah to position itself as the only 
organization capable of protecting Shi’a interests. All other attempts to protect the Shi’a 
from external threat had failed, and Hezbollah was formed to allow for greater collective 
action. The failure of the Lebanese government to end the cycle of violence and poverty 
in the Shia community created a power vacuum. 102 Hezbollah formed in order to combat 
a real threat and prospered due to a legitimate ability to affect change.103 
A collective is necessary to combine efforts and coopt interests. One of the more 
prominent theorists in this school is the sociologist and political scientist Sidney Tarrow, 
who argues that actors who lack resources will gather together in order to accomplish a 
goal that would be impossible to without collective action. According to this theory, 
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single actors cannot fight the established system without the support of like-minded 
cohorts. As a group begins to grow the relationship between actors begins to formalize 
and allow for greater pooling of resources. If a group wants to become larger and more 
powerful, it will broaden its goals and allow for greater cultural, social and economic 
incentives. As time progresses, the ties between actors become more formal and 
engrained within the organization, which allows for a united, sustained resistance against 
the status quo.104 
2. Opportunity 
Opportunity and constraint are also important factors to analyze when studying 
the formation of Hezbollah. Sidney Tarrow argues that opportunities are more important 
to the formation of a mass social movement. Constraints may cause some discontent, but 
do not provide the proper amount of incentive. For potential leaders, opportunities 
become a means to organize people around a cause for a sustained amount of time. 
Simple discontentment may cause brief violent action, but does not sustain a movement. 
Sustained opportunity is necessary to perpetuate a group’s ability to grow and evolve. 
Tarrow succinctly illustrates his key dimensions in mobilization succinctly:  
(1) The opening of access for participation for new actors; (2) the evidence 
of political realignment in the polity; (3) the appearance of influential 
elites; (5) emerging splits within the elite; and (5) a decline in the state’s 
capacity or will to repress dissent.105 
Other sociologists such as Tilly, Kurzman, and Martin continue the analysis of 
opportunity, and show that movement leaders are only successful when it is structurally 
and economically feasible. Resources are needed to create a successful movement, and 
outrage does not mobilize support by itself.106 The state must not have the ability or the 
will to repress a movement. Also, organizers need to have the opportunity to pool a large 
amount of resources, whether they are economic, political or organizational.  
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While it may seem counter intuitive, repression can also create opportunity for a 
movement. Authoritarian regimes often respond to growing social movements with 
violence. This gives would-be leaders the opportunity to frame repression as an unjust 
action. From there, the movement can create a political and ideological adversary, which 
can be used to strengthen their stance.107 
3. Mobilizing Structures 
Mobilizing structures are necessary for the successful organization of a 
movement. Established groups, like religious institutions, social clubs, and 
neighborhoods offer a power structure, collective identity and a meeting place. These 
existing organizations effectively homogenize identity, and offer a greater chance of 
continued success.108 They key aspect of these established entities are the social networks 
that they create. They offer interaction between actors, services, and a sense of 
community. The mobilizing structures can be formal or informal, but must offer a forum 
for interaction.  
4. Framing and Collective Identity 
While Tarrow, Kurzman, and others stress the presence of concrete opportunity as 
a means of organization, other social movement theorists have stressed the role of 
collective identity. According to these theorists, the perception of a community is 
necessary in order to consolidate interests and motivate action. It is not always a simple 
cost-benefit analysis that moves people to join a collective. People share bonds that are 
beyond political, economic and social considerations. Formal and informal networks of 
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and Jasper, “Activists are not the isolated, atomistic individuals sociologists once took 
them for in the past.”109 They argue that loyalty to an imagined or concrete community is 
essential to motivate a normal person to action.110 
Prospective leaders must either create an identity, or draw on an existing 
community in order to draw up support for a cause. Existing communities can be 
powerful motivators for action. Religion, class and social status can be strong sources of 
solidarity for new members. Leaders can call on these existing frameworks as a means to 
organize. This is not to say that identities have to be established beforehand. Leaders can 
help to frame the message of the organization in order to incorporate a greater number of 
followers. For example, there may be many white, middle-class males who agree on a 
certain issue, but those identities do not necessarily motivate them to action. The issue 
becomes the means to create a new perceived community, which helps to broaden the 
potential base of support. Issues such as poverty, taxation, lack of representation, and 
repression from the state bind people together, and need to be placed at the forefront by 
movement organizers. Furthermore, the leadership must reinforce this identity in order to 
sustain the feeling of community, and to mitigate any possible feelings of difference.111 
The formation of group identity also comes into play when developing 
organizational tactics. Many resistance groups pride themselves on staying within the 
law, and others find their identity through armed resistance. Using violence can create a 
strong bond between like-minded members, and form an identity that appeals to 
outsiders. As a corollary, violence can damage the identity of an organization, and can 
keep prospective members from joining the ranks. With this in mind, organizers must be 
cognizant of both the message of their organization, and the actions they undertake from 
a cost-benefit perspective, and an identity perspective. This is not to say that repertoires 
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of resistance do not change. The tactics of an organization can evolve given the 
prevailing circumstances, but also need to align with the accepted collective identity.112  
B. ARMED RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
Social movement theory attempts to explain why people are attracted to 
Hezbollah, and why the organization was successful in garnering support from the 
general public in a general sense. These theories explain the beginnings of a social 
movement, but do not address how organizational policies change dramatically over a 
relatively short period of time, or how a movement can sustain itself through 
organizational change. A large amount of scholarship has been dedicated to the study of 
terrorist organizations—how they evolve, grow and mature. These theoretical trends will 
help to explain why Hezbollah changed its ideological stance in 1992. 
1. Instrumental Approach 
Academics have long attempted to explain the dynamics of armed resistance 
groups, and how institutional policies are formed. The instrumental theoretical model of 
terrorist organizations was used as the primary lens of analysis for many years. 
Academics and politicians alike used this approach to create policy and understand the 
inner workings of armed resistance organizations. The institutional approach has since 
fallen out of favor in politics and academia, but it still offers a valuable mode of analysis.  
The instrumental approach assumes that all movements, political or revolutionary, 
are purposeful and rational in their action. The emphasis on rationality is brought to all 
levels of the organization. All members of the collective apply a cost-benefit analysis to 
all decisions, either within or outside the closed system. This approach comes from the 
realist theory of international relations—that all humans are inherently rational creatures. 
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best information, will make predictable choices given the rewards and costs. In essence, 
members of an armed resistance group are there as long as they are rewarded in 
proportion to their individual suffering.113 
While the instrumental approach stresses individual rationality, it also places a 
great emphasis on the existence of an insulated, unitary movement towards a universal 
goal. It severely discounts the individual intellectual process that comes with deciding to 
participate in or leave a movement. Actors have, through making a conscious decision to 
join a group, decided to forego certain ideological principals in order to strengthen their 
resolve against what they see is a threat. Cynthia Irvin explains the instrumental approach 
succinctly: “It may be more accurate to view them as an opportunistic collection of 
divergent interest groups, temporarily banded together to pursue goals that are developed 
through internal political discourse.”114  
The instrumental view on the unitary nature of terrorist organizations is supported 
by the work by Cameron, in his work on social movements in 1966: 
Those in authority attempt to justify their rule over institutions by linking 
it, as if it were a necessary consequence, with widely believed-in moral 
symbols, sacred emblems, [and] legal formulae. These central conceptions 
may refer to a god or gods, the aristocracy of talent or wealth, to the divine 
right of kings, or the allegedly extraordinary endowment of the ruler 
himself. Social scientists, following Weber, call such conceptions 
‘legitimations,’ or sometimes ‘symbols of justification’…all these and 
others like them testify to the central place of master symbols in social 
analysis.115 
Cameron assumes people are inherently different, and that they have differing 
interests, but a structural system holds the collective together. Whether this structure is 
based on a strong charismatic leader, symbols, emblems, or the law. Within this system, 
people do not have to agree on all issues, but they do have to agree that the symbolic  
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nature of their movement is important. The symbol becomes the justification for 
continued participation. In this sense, the collective values of the organization become 
more important than the individual goals of members.  
The presence of a charismatic leader is essential in the instrumental approach. The 
formation of policy is a top-down process, and is used to maintain some semblance of 
order. Top-down policy formation serves to influence all members and is a means to 
change people’s minds. Martha Crenshaw argues that a group’s actions are a direct 
reflection of the ideological beliefs of the leadership.116 A terrorist organization operates 
as a unitary actor. The leadership uses members as a means to an end. The members of an 
organization represent a pool of potential violent actors who could elicit a change from 
the established system. There is a need for collective values, but the overall goal is to 
cause a change in the actor’s environment, not coopt the entire polity. Leaders do not 
create policies to ensure membership, but in order to maintain the semblance of 
ideological purity. 117 
2. Organizational Approach 
The organizational approach was the result of sociologists who attempted to fill 
the logical gaps in the instrumental view. Few organizations are homogenous, unitary 
actors. Organizational theorists feel that too much emphasis has been placed on the 
formation of ideology, the role of leadership, and the importance of symbolism. 
Organizational analysis offers a different view of the world and of the people who 
mobilize against the status quo. Individual values can bring people together, not simple 
dogmatic allegiance to a leader, symbol or policy. Organizational theory offers a deeper 
understanding of the internal workings of an armed resistance group, and reveals the true 
intentions of actors, not simply the journalistic recitation of their propaganda.118 
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The organizational mode of analysis assumes activists are individualistic, and use 
their chosen organizations as a vehicle to propel individual needs and desires. Members 
bring their own interest, ideology and faith into the debate over policy. Organizations are 
not homogenous, and must offer a variety of different services to their new recruits. 
There is an overall dominant goal, but motivations are different for each individual 
member of the group. This view also highlights the subjectivity of rational action. 
Different cultures, religions and socio-economic groups may have divergent views on 
what constitutes rational action. What may be rational for some members of the collective 
may be completely unacceptable to others, and this internal debate is important in the 
policy making process.119 
The organizational approach offers a different explanation for continued 
resistance. Members of the collective are not simply hired hands, and they do not work 
for benefits like employees in a factory. There is a socialization process that makes 
members feel like they are an inexorable a part of the collective, and they begin to align 
their interests to that of the organization. In a terrorist organization, people may join 
initially as a means to enact vengeance, but the leadership must construct an identity that 
covers a multitude of different beliefs in order to garner support from less violent 
prospective members.120 
C. CONCLUSION 
Each one of these theories, whether they are about social movements or armed 
resistance groups, offers some insight into the internal workings of Hezbollah, and how 
the ideological change of 1992 is a logical consequence. The question then becomes 
which one of these models explains Hezbollah’s decision-making process? The answer 
seems to be that a blend of all approaches presents the most comprehensive analysis, 
because none of these theories stand as a logical tautology.  
Moral outrage was a large motivator for many Shi’a. Years of civil war between 
the different confessions left many without any opportunities for employment or basic 
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services. Hezbollah offered a means to enact retribution against those who were seen as 
responsible for the deprivation and violence. Years of economic disparity between the 
Shi’a and other major confessions also engrained a deep feeling of resentment within the 
community, and there was seemingly no other way to change the cycle of inaction on the 
political stage. The confessional government did not offer the opportunities necessary, 
and so many became disillusioned, angry and violent towards the establishment. 
Hezbollah’s collective action also came out of a feeling of necessity. Militias were killing 
each other, setting up roadblocks, and harassing the Shi’a population. Many felt that 
Amal and other organizations were not doing enough to protect the local population, and 
as such, looked for a more effective means of protecting the neighborhood. Violence 
legitimatized Hezbollah, and the continued conflict ensured a large pool of willing 
participants. 
The opportunity to participate as a political actor during the Lebanese civil war 
was easy to accomplish, since the Lebanese government could not repress growing 
resistance movements. The civil war depended on the use of decentralized militias, and 
the government did not have the ability to monitor or control the growth of organizations 
within its own borders. The actions of the Amal leadership presented an opportunity for 
the formation of a new resistance group. Cooperation with the established confessional 
government and tacit support of the Israeli mission in Lebanon severely weakened the 
movement. This provided a context for more radical elements to espouse their beliefs and 
rely on the discontent of the Shi’a populations. The polity within the Shi’a community 
was beginning to realign with a more radical message, one that Amal could not claim to 
support. The creation of a radical wing in Amal and the appearance of influential elites, 
such as Abbas al-Musawi and Hassan Nasrallah, marked a shift in the ideology of Shi’a 
resistance.  
The existence of a Shi’a middle class in the late 1970s also contributed to the 
growth of a new better-funded elite within the community. In lieu of opportunities at 
home, many Shi’a left Lebanon for better opportunity in Northern Africa and the Gulf 
states, which created a new pool of economic benefits to the community. These new elite 
also gained the support of Iran, which provided the training, money and people necessary 
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to establish a lasting social movement. Hezbollah’s formation and popularity can be 
traced back to concrete opportunities. The radical leaders of the time framed these 
seemingly isolated cultural undercurrents in order to coopt the disillusioned within the 
Shi’a community. 
The organizational tactics of Hezbollah helped to form their identity in Lebanon 
and throughout the world. Resistance against Israel, Amal and various other militias 
became the hallmark of Hezbollah’s identity, even before the formation of a radical 
Islamist ideology. From 1982 to 1985, Hezbollah legitimized itself to the Shi’a as an 
effective armed resistance movement. The war of the camps further demonstrated the 
strength of this new identity, and the large amount of Shi’a who felt a part of this new 
radical community. 
Hezbollah’s early leadership sought to create an identity that was ideologically 
pure and separated from corruption. The unjust distribution of power within the Lebanese 
confessional government meant that the Shi’a could not exercise their fair share of 
governance. Political Maronites became the closest and most vivid characterization of the 
ideological “other.” Maronites and their domestic allies were the oppressors—they 
sponsored the confessional government, encouraged cooperation with the west, and 
allowed the use of violence. The Civil War further exacerbated the grievances of the 
oppressed Shi’a and set the stage for the emergence of a new, radical politics. 
Hezbollah’s Open Letter of 1985 set the organization not only for resistance, but also as 
the ideological opposite of Israel, the Lebanese government, and the West. They would 
not cooperate with these corrupting entities, since it was their influence that marginalized 
the Shi’a. Furthermore, Hezbollah set out to show itself different than Amal and the 
former political bosses, since they demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the 
established government, coopted the support of Israel, and clashed with the PLO. 121 
Hezbollah’s collective identity became a mix of protracted armed resistance and 
radical political ideology. The only way to overcome the sins and abuses of the past can  
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only come through resistance, and the establishment of an Islamic republic. When 
violence failed to create a new form of governance, a new identity was created to support 
the political programs. 
The instrumental approach to terrorist organizations offers some value to the 
discussion of Hezbollah, but many of the theories that support this approach have fallen 
out of favor in the last 30 years. Academia has recognized the value of social movement 
theory as a sociological study, and the instrumental model is based on political science. 
Too much emphasis is placed on human rationality, and that there is an accepted group of 
rational actions which outside actors can use to leverage organizations. The assumption 
that the group acts as a unitary whole leaves little to no room for policy change. Terrorist 
groups use violence as a strategic choice, and the ends justify the means. Any change 
from the established model would represent a failure to achieve the ultimate goal. In 
short, the instrumental approach is not supported by recent scholarship, and does not 
explain ideological shifts within Hezbollah.122 
The organizational perspective assumes that group decisions are the result of 
internal dynamics. Members of the collective participate in a debate where the ends and 
means are debated. Terrorist organizations are not unitary actors; empirical evidence has 
proven the existence of factionalism within the most successful of armed resistance 
organizations.123 The debates between influential actors create a result that is more 
palatable to a larger constituency. Hezbollah changed its position in 1992 after years of 
protracted conflict and an unwillingness to participate in the political process. This 
speaks to the value of the organizational theory. 124 
Hezbollah is made up of a diverse group of political actors. The leadership created 
an identity that was based on violence and oppression in order to gain a strong base of 
militants, but later realized that continued participation in the collective was contingent 
on the delivery of services, and the flexibility in ideologies could be a strength if framed 
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correctly. Armed resistance groups may form quickly in the face of necessity and 
opportunity, but after the initial rush, factions begin to appear. The leadership needed to 
create a new identity that would coalesce the different ideological stances within the 
organization. Furthermore, the Taif Agreement forced a marked change in the character 
of the militia in Lebanon. Hezbollah could no longer simply operate outside of the 
system. They needed to change strategies in order to effect change and win more support 
in the long term. The next chapter will analyze the debates over the political program that 
occurred prior to 1992 and will further argue that the organizational approach to terrorist 






THIS PAGE LOOKS INTENTIONALLY BLANK 
 57
V. THE CREATION OF HEZBOLLAH’S ELECTORAL 
PROGRAM  
In the early 1990s, Hezbollah created a new set of political ideologies that starkly 
contrasted its originally stated goals. This juxtaposition seemed unthinkable due to the 
group’s previous radical Islamist political program. The Open Letter of 1985 was the 
formalization of a group of Islamist ideologies that had been developing in the Shi’a 
community since the 1970s. This manifesto succinctly stated the goals of the 
organization, and demonstrated a radical resolve that had not been popular previously. To 
Hezbollah, the only way to change the existing system was to come at the problem in a 
different way. The western models for governance did not offer the proper amount of 
justice to all people within Lebanon. Islam was the only framework that could afford the 
maximum amount of justice on a national level. As such, all cooperation with the 
established government was frowned upon, and Hezbollah took an exclusionary stance 
against those who recognized the established authority.  
Hezbollah felt that their call to action would not only change the minds of the 
Lebanese, but all people throughout the world. After the establishment of an Islamic 
republic in Lebanon, other governments and people would recognize the value of this 
form of governance, and naturally would choose this new system. Hezbollah’s early 
political rhetoric called for a complete overhaul of the international system. This rhetoric 
reflected the radicalization of the Shi’a community and the size of the organization. 
Several studies in social movement theory have proven that smaller movements need to 
radicalize their message in order to prove their legitimacy and to recruit more 
members.125 Hezbollah was now growing in popularity due to their ability to enact 
violence against threats to the Shi’a community, but this only guaranteed a steady flow of 
men to the cause. In order to create a larger, more diverse constituency, Hezbollah 
needed to adjust the radical message of the organization.  
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The Taif Agreement, which was formalized in 1989, brought to an end the civil 
war that ravaged the country since 1975. This agreement also changed the proportion of 
seats in the government, and divided them equally among Christians and Muslims. 
Previously, Maronite Christians enjoyed a 6 to 5 ratio in all government seats. Now each 
confessional would enjoy 27 seats.126 The seats would represent districts that included 
multiple religious confessions, which was an attempt to force cooperation between the 
different faiths. The hope was to create coalitions between different political parties, 
which would foster greater cooperation on the basis of politics, not religion. In order to 
foster peaceful debate, the agreement called for the abandonment of all militias, who 
were to turn in their arms and create political programs. Hezbollah was exempt from this 
requirement, but only because of their ability to fight the Israelis, not domestic 
enemies.127 
The process of overhauling the political program did not come easily. Hezbollah’s 
leadership and constituency debated the value of a cooperative political program and 
many seriously considered it to be a betrayal to the movement. To many in the 
leadership, the decision to participate in the parliamentary elections the same conciliatory 
stance that previous Shi’a organizations had taken. This chapter will analyze the radical 
early political ideology, and will show that it was exclusive in its rhetoric. This chapter 
will also analyze the debates between different leaders in Hezbollah in order to exhibit 
the role of group dynamics in armed resistance organizations. All will serve to 
demonstrate that the organizational approach to the study of terrorist organizations is the 
most reliable analytical model, and that modern social movement theory accurately 
predicts the moderation of Hezbollah. 
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A. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1982 TO 1991: VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE 
AGAINST THE STATUS QUO 
The introduction of Hezbollah’s Open Letter demonstrates a level of political 
resolve that would not be easily overcome: “Whoever takes Allah, His Apostle and those 
who believe as friends [must know] that Allah’s party [Hezbollah] is indeed the 
triumphant.”128 Hezbollah’s political ideology from 1985 to 1992 reflects pessimism in 
the established confessional system, and an optimism that the Iran model can serve as 
inspiration for all Muslims in the world. At the outset of the movement, Hezbollah 
constructed a political identity deeply rooted in global resistance. The success of the 
Iranian revolution was the model for jihad on the world stage, and it was every Muslim’s 
obligation to protect the faith. The political framework continues this trend. To 
Hezbollah, resistance against the Lebanese government was not an option for pious 
Muslims; it was an obligation.129 
Hezbollah’s radical, often revolutionary language is continued through the 
political stance against western influence. As the letter states, “Imam Khumayni has 
stressed time and again that America is behind all our catastrophes and it’s the mother of 
all vice.”130 All of the sins of the confessional government could be traced back to the 
strong, arrogant influence of the United States, its NATO allies, and the Zionists. They 
felt that the American conception of the organization was overly myopic, that the US 
only recognized the violent actions of the organization. It is interesting to note that 
Hezbollah’s perception of the United States is somewhat dichotomous. it understood that 
its violent actions forced the U.S.’s characterization, but also would not move from their 
organizational or political tactics. Hezbollah felt that the US was complicit in the creation 
of a violent movement, and it was willing to use any means to remove foreign influence 
from the Muslim world. As stated in the Open Letter, “All attempts made to drive us into 
marginal actions will fail, especially as our determination to fight the US is solid.”131 
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Moderation and marginalization were seen as evils of the past—practices that the zu’ama 
and Amal participated in. 
Hezbollah’s original political ideology was not concerned with simple domestic 
politics. It felt that the Iranian experience served as a model to all Muslims and that the 
sins of the past could be overcome through the thoughtful application of Islamic 
governance. The main sources of political ideology in the Lebanese system came from 
Western conceptions, and therefor were a corrupting influence. To Hezbollah, the main 
sources of governance should be the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the guidance of the jurist. 
These sources of power offered the most equitable share of justice among all confessions. 
All peoples, if they were oppressed under the western system, could find refuge in the 
political program of the Hezbollah movement.132 
While the US, NATO and Israel stood as worthy external opponents, Hezbollah 
found its domestic adversary in the Maronite Christians. As to their feelings on the 
confessional government, the Open Letter outright criticizes those who use the existing 
system as a means for political and social change. The following excerpt from the Open 
Letter demonstrates the deep distrust of the Maronites and their confessional government: 
All such opposition, which operates within the framework of the 
conversation and safeguarding of the present constitution without 
demanding changes at the level of the very foundation of the regime, is 
hence, an opposition of pure formality, which cannot satisfy the interests 
of the oppressed masses…Moreover, we cannot be concerned by any 
proposition of political reform, which accepts the rotten [Lebanese 
political] system actually in effect. We could not care less about the 
creation of this or that government coalition or about the participation of 
this or that political personality in some ministerial post, which is but a 
part of this unjust regime.133 
This short passage takes to task the political trends in the Lebanese system. Nabih 
Berri and the Amal leadership began to cooperate with the existing system, which was 
seen as a betrayal to the Shi’a cause. Amal began to operate in a larger political sense, 
coopting support from other parties, including Sunni and Maronite. To Hezbollah, this 
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was simply lip service to the actual cause of political change. Maronites who promoted 
social change from within were also to be distrusted, since they had such a large 
proportion of power under the existing framework. Even if the existing system produced 
real political change, this would be inherently corrupt because the entire environment was 
wholly unjust. The only thing that could produce an acceptable atmosphere would be a 
top-down overhaul of the entire government.  
Hezbollah was determined to establish an Islamic republic. This was the only way 
to overcome the corruption and remove the dependence on outside powers. The suffering 
of the Lebanese people could be overcome through just application of Islamic 
jurisprudence, and a complete rejection of western values. Important in the Open Letter is 
the justification of their resistance, and how they would impose Islamic rule in Lebanon. 
Throughout the letter, the organization states that it does not want to impose faith on 
anyone, just as they would not want any other confessional forced on them. They reaffirm 
their stance that the People of The Book are accepted, just as they were during the Golden 
Age of Islam. To Hezbollah, Islamic governance does not mean a forced conversion, but 
a government that is guided by the ethical and moral principles of the faith. As a 
consequence of this change, all people of faith would understand the justice inherit in the 
Islamic model, and would continue to choose this as their form of governance.134 
Moreover, all outside forms of government external to Islam were rejected. Hezbollah’s 
leaders felt that western style democracy and Communism were as corrupt as any 
influence.135 
The language of the Open Letter perfectly illustrates the political climate that 
Hezbollah attempted to compete in from 1985 to 1991. This was an organization that 
legitimized itself through protracted violence and resistance against the status quo. As a 
result, they found their ideological base was vehemently opposed to the established 
government and the perceived corruptive influence of outside powers. In a wartime 
environment, it is easy to see why this type of ideology could sustain a social movement.  
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Violence dictated the formation, consolidation and resistance of Hezbollah, and 
continued to influence the group ideology, and this was reinforced by intense hatred of 
Israel.  
Hezbollah states in the Open Letter that it is their political goal to remove US, 
French and NATO influence from their government by any means necessary. These 
statements do imply the use of force, but at no point do they state a desire for the 
complete destruction of European and U.S. governments. This consideration is not 
extended to Israel. The 1982 invasion created an abject hatred for Israel and served as one 
of the greatest recruiting tools for the organization. Hezbollah calls for the complete 
dissolution of Israel with no chance of cooperation. As the Open Letter states, “We 
recognize no treaty with it [Israel], no ceasefire, and no peace agreements, whether 
separate or consolidated.”136  
B. THE TAIF AGREEMENT  
In 1989, the Arab League became increasingly concerned with the ongoing 
conflict in Lebanon. As a result, the governments of Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, 
placed pressure on the Lebanese government to accept peace negotiations. MPs from 
Lebanon, who were elected prior to the civil war, were called to Taif, Saudi Arabia in 
order to hash out an agreement that would end the years of bloodshed. What resulted 
from these talks was the Document of National Reconciliation (Taif Agreement). This 
was the first official acknowledgment of the demographic shifts within Lebanon. It 
sought to rectify the incongruence between political power and population size. The three 
largest confessions, Maronties, Sunni and Shi’a, were to be given equal representation 
within the parliament. This would help to change the 6 to 5 advantage the Maronite 
community enjoyed within the government.137  
Syria’s role in the development of the Taif Agreement cannot be understated. In 
1987, Lebanese Prime Minister Selim al-Hoss requested Syrian support in Beruit in order 
to quell violent militias. The invitation to enter Lebanon was quickly taken advantage of 
                                                 
136 Ibid., 48. 
137 Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 45. 
 63
by the Assad regime, which wished to show a stronger hand in Lebanese politics. The 
Taif Agreement specifically outlined Syria as the protector of the new agreement, and 
that the Syrian people held a special interest in Lebanon. This sentiment was reinforced 
by the U.S., which wanted a quick resolution to the civil war. Syria was the only regional 
power that had the willingness and capacity to end the conflict, and they demonstrated 
their resolve with the introduction of over 40, 000 troops. Syria was now the guarantor of 
the Taif Agreement terms. 138 
Syria quickly made use of its troops by assisting the Lebanese military in the 
enforcement of the agreement terms. Domestic militias were ordered to cease hostilities, 
turn in their weapons and close their training centers. The militias that used violence as 
their means of negotiation were ordered to establish political programs and participate 
from within the system. While Syria helped to end other armed militias, they negotiated 
for the sustainability of Hezbollah, which would continue the resistance against the 
Israelis in the south. Syria could now focus on their control of the central government, 
since it would be Hezbollah’s job to remove Israel from Lebanese territory. The terms 
between the Syrian and Lebanese government were formalized in 1991 with the signing 
of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, which set a legal basis for 
continued Syrian presence in domestic and international affairs.139  
In 1991, Syria nominated 40 provisional seats to the parliament, which would 
oversee the daily workings of government prior to a national election. These pro-Syrian 
MPs then went about establishing a system of elections that would ensure Damascus’s 
hold on the country for years to come. Additionally, the pro-Syrian government brokered 
a deal with Hezbollah. In return for participating in the political process, Hezbollah was 
allowed to continue its activities against the Israelis to the south and now under the 
political cover of the Lebanese and Syrian governments. Armed resistance to Israel could 
now be framed as a national resistance and not the activities of a terrorist organization.140 
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C. THE DEBATE OVER A POLITICAL PROGRAM 
Civil peace sparked a vigorous debate over the future of Hezbollah. The Ta’if 
agreement in Lebanon called for the dissolution of all militias, but Hezbollah had a deep 
distrust of the central government. Hezbollah reacted by launching a public relations 
campaign, which attempted to legitimize violent action. This campaign was used to 
maintain the group’s position within society now that fighting ceased between militias. 
Without their legitimacy through arms, it was decided that certain political action was 
necessary to ensure the survival of the movement. 
In 1991, 12 members of Hezbollah’s leadership gathered in order to debate the 
reasons for participation in the Lebanese political system. The membership of this 
council included the seven-member Shura council and five other leading cadres.141 The 
head of the 12-member council, Hajj Muhamad Ra’d stated publicly that the decision to 
create a political program was a difficult one, but that the debate over the program was 
constructive. Ra’d stated that this committee was a necessity, since Hezbollah’s vision for 
the future depended on cooperation with the established government. He worked frame a 
new vision for the future of the party, one that was much less in contention with the status 
quo. Ra’d felt that Hezbollah was essentially a Lebanese movement, and that nationalism 
was an important part of the political message. He felt that Hezbollah shared many of the 
same concerns as other political parties, and that some semblance of cooperation could be 
achieved, because each militia was still working towards confession goals, but within less 
violent political parties. Ra’d did feel that Hezbollah could participate without 
abandoning the organization’s ideological purity—they simply would use the system to 
have a larger voice on the national stage. As Alagha states in his book on Hezbollah’s 
political ideology, “Ra’d stressed that political life dictates practical interaction with 
other groups without delving into the ideological background of every party.”142 
Other influential members of the council, including Na’im Qassem, Nasrallah, 
and Subhi al-Tufayli worked to find ideological justification for participation in the 
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electoral process. Most of the information pertaining to these debates comes directly from 
Na’im Qassem, who provided a detailed account of the discussions. Augustus Richard 
Norton and Joseph Alagha both use Qassem’s accounts, and illustrate four key questions 
that had to be answered by the twelve members. Alagha summarizes their four key points 
succinctly: (1) legitimacy of the current government; (2) abandonment of previous ideals; 
(3) the role of interests outside the norm; (4) the priorities of the party in the system.143 
Hezbollah’s political ideology from 1985 to 1991 stressed the illegitimacy of the 
confessional government, and that resistance the only means to overcome the corruption 
of the past. To Hezbollah, the Lebanese government was the product of the machinations 
of the U.S. and Israel, and that it did not ensure a just distribution of power among 
confessions. The only means to overcome the sins of the past was through the 
establishment of an Islamic government. The question before the council then became: 
Would participation in the electoral process grant legitimacy to a corrupt, unjust system?  
The council decided to defer the decision to their overarching ideological leader, 
Ali Khamenei of Iran. Khameini eventually gave his blessing, that Hezbollah can 
participate in the Lebanese system, and that they were permitted to run a political wing. 
This removed the first barrier against political participation, since Hezbollah’s leadership 
felt that it was their religious duty to follow the example of their Iranian ideological 
cohorts. While there were many reasons for Khameini’s decision, Norton and Alagha 
outline the political environment in the Lebanese electorate. Lebanese citizens outside of 
the organization had the suspicion that Hezbollah was not a national movement and that 
its guidance from Iran constituted a harmful foreign influence. Hezbollah and Khameini 
had a mutual interest in outlining Hezbollah as a nationalist organization. With the 
development of a political program, Iran could reduce their financial and military support 
and Hezbollah could work to bolster their position as a legitimate political participant..144 
The next subject before the council was the question of participation, and whether 
political involvement would strengthen the system that was already in place. There were 
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many in the leadership that felt that Hezbollah was abandoning its previous ideals, and 
that political participation would only serve to strengthen the confessional system that 
was inherently corrupt. The committee felt that the existing system would change the 
entire nature of the organization and would negate any real progress towards their goal of 
top-down political change. 145 The council worked around this debate by stating that 
Hezbollah’s political participation in no way was an endorsement of the confessional 
government. Hezbollah could simply use the electoral system to express its radical stance 
on a larger stage and work with other parties to further their ideological stance. 
Additionally, many felt that participation would enable Hezbollah’s elected officials to 
help bring about the end of the system, and to exploit legal loopholes.  
Hezbollah’s 12-member council used a pragmatic approach in order to determine 
their role in the political system. In the end, the pros outweighed any foreseeable cons. 
The organization could use the parliamentary system as a stage to espouse their resistance 
ideals, and could draft legislation that challenged the system. Hezbollah’s 
parliamentarians could fight pending legislation from within the system, and could have 
prior knowledge of laws that would hurt their constituency. The political contacts gained 
would help build an even greater resistance against the established government, and 
would help to further the interests of the Shi’a population. Finally, participation forced 
the Lebanese government to recognize Hezbollah and its political platform. The 
resistance could continue under political contention, not with armed conflict.146 
Hezbollah’s leadership decided that ideological purity could be maintained within 
the Lebanese electoral system. The ideology of resistance would be the mainstay of the 
political platform, and elections would not change the overall character of the movement. 
Rather, many members felt that participation would only serve to strengthen their 
ideology, since they could coopt a greater number of members. If Hezbollah existed only 
outside of the political spectrum, it would have to create ties with other resistance 
organizations that may not represent the cannon of their resistance. The 12-member 
committee reported their findings to the Ayatollah, concurred. Hezbollah then stated its 
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goals with the political declaration of 1992, which set the tone for its electoral program, 
and the growth of the organization throughout the end of the 1990s.147 
D. THE POLITICAL DECLARATION OF 1992 
In 1992, the Lebanese people returned to the polls for the first time in 20 years. A 
myriad of different political parties filled the vacuum and attempted to coopt as much 
support from the electorate as possible. Hezbollah debated their electoral program 
throughout 1991, and came to the decision to participate. The Political Declaration of 
1992 officially started Hezbollah’s political program and defined the new ideological 
stance. The document opens with a sense of the organization’s obligation to protect the 
people of Lebanon from oppression, and that the path towards a political program was the 
inevitable consequence of protracted resistance.148 The end of the introduction states, 
“We made up our mind, relying on God, and decided to participate in electoral politics on 
the basis of a comprehensive political program, in which our candidates are obliged to do 
their utmost best to put it [political program] into operation, asking our populace to 
support it and follow up on it.”149 
The Political Declaration of 1992 begins in a similar fashion to the Open Letter of 
1985, but does not espouse religious ideals in the same fashion. The political ideology of 
Hezbollah prior to 1992 was marked by an idealism that was rooted in religious 
extremism. The Political Declaration shows pragmatism, separation from overtly 
religious language, and includes a greater nationalistic dialogue. This represented an 
attempt to open the resistance to all religious confessions, not just the Shi’a community. 
Central to this theme is the perception of oppression. All religions and people within the 
Lebanese system, if they were oppressed, could participate in this new ideology. Not 
coincidentally, it was assumed that Islam offered the greatest chance for justice. While 
religion is mentioned, there is no overt call for conversion of any Lebanese citizens, and  
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extreme religious conservatism is not espoused. The party platform leading into the 1992 
elections stressed a resistance against economic inequality, underdevelopment, and the 
corrupt political system.150 
Hezbollah’s political ideology also stressed its position on security for the nation 
as a whole. The Lebanese government allowed Hezbollah to retain much of its military 
power as a balance against the Israelis in the south. The position of the organization 
underwent a shift in priorities for the use of force. Hezbollah did not just provide security 
for its own neighborhoods—it stressed its continued resistance on a national level. 
Hezbollah’s violence was for all Lebanese, not just for Shi’a. Security became an 
essential part of the political program, and to further this position, Hezbollah used its 
military arm, the Islamic Resistance as an effective tool. From 1990 to 1995, the Islamic 
Resistance carried out over a thousand militant operations against the IDF and similar 
targets. This was a tenfold increase over the previous five years.151 Israel and the Western 
establishment were seen as corrupting influences, and Hezbollah successfully used their 
strong military position as proof of potential political efficacy.152 
E. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the decision to participate in parliamentary elections seems to fly 
in the face of Hezbollah’s previous political ideology. The instrumental analysis of 
terrorist organizations espouses the unitary nature of terrorist organizations, and they 
difficulty inherit in ideological shifts. This perspective ignores the group dynamics within 
an organization, and the debates that occur when organizational tactics are discussed. 
Older social movement and contentious politics theories cannot explain Hezbollah’s shift 
away from outright resistance against the Lebanese government. These perspectives 
assume an organization cannot exist if their ideological goals are not met. 153 Hezbollah  
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grew in popularity following the moderation of its political stance, which contradicts the 
instrumental view of terrorist organizations and the relative deprivation social movement 
theories. 
Hezbollah’s decision to participate in parliamentary elections represents 
pragmatism in the consciousness of social movements and terrorist organizations. 
Fractures between the leadership demonstrated the group dynamics that create policy. 
This reflects the organizational analysis of armed resistance organizations. There was no 
single leader that created policy, and no dogmatic reliance on a strong central character. It 
was the collective that came together in order to create a more inclusive ideology, one 
that would incorporate a greater number of adherents. Some in the leadership, including 
al-Tufayli rejected the electoral process, but others saw greater benefit in cooperation and 
muted the voices of the minority.154 
The role of opportunity is evident. The end of the Civil War created an 
environment where Hezbollah could affect real change from within the system and 
bolster the position of the organization. The Lebanese government afforded the 
opportunity to retain arms against the Israelis, and create a new means of coordinating 
support. The structural opportunities existed for a modification of group ideology. When 
10 members of the council voted to enter parliamentary elections, they made the decision 
with the understanding that greater opportunity existed, and that their actions were now 
sanctioned by the state. In short, Hezbollah’s greatest opportunity came from the 
Lebanese government and the stipulations within the Taif Accord. Resistance parties can 
only participate within the existing political framework when the existing political actors 
legitimize them.155  
Party legitimization took place at all levels of the political organization, from the 
elites to the grassroots. Hezbollah successfully used mass media as a means to support 
the political party, and managed expectations from within the institutional rules. It was 
the elites who realized that votes mean power, and they expressed the advantages of 
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participation to their radical constituency and Iran. This speaks of a leadership and 
constituency that is not an ideological unitary whole. The debate among the twelve-
member council represented a diverse set of values. It was the job of the leadership to 
then frame the message in a way that was as palatable to the largest population. While 
Hezbollah may have lost many radicals, the decision to participate in parliamentary 
elections created larger base of support. Hezbollah’s parliamentary seats continued to 
grow from eight in 1992 to 12 in 2014.156 
Cynthia Irvine’s work on Basque separatists in Spain and the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) demonstrates many of the same trends as this study. She argues that when 
opportunity is opened in the political arena, terrorist organizations are more likely to 
moderate their stance. Actions by the security forces in each of these countries simply 
added fuel to the militant fire. When these governments allowed opened the political 
process, their use of violence was completely delegitimized, and so they had to readjust. 
Group survival was more important than the achievement of each organization’s 
originally state goals.157  
I argue Hezbollah changed its political stance to ensure movement survival, which 
is comparable to the decisions made by other armed resistance organizations, and that this 
argument is strengthened by the preceding chapters on social movement theory. 
Hezbollah is comprised of a diverse set of individual actors, who bring their own desires 
to the table. The leadership may have looked to Iran for approval, but they still 
understood the value of the local constituency. The political declaration of 1992, along 
with the later grassroots campaign worked to generate an even greater, moderate 
constituency over various confessions.  
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study analyzed the creation and evolution of Hezbollah’s electoral program 
from 1982 to 1992. Hezbollah was created out of a crucible of violence, political 
instability, and foreign occupation. The Shi’a in Lebanon were consistently 
disenfranchised by their political system, and this thesis argues that the creation of a 
radical movement was a natural consequence of the radicalization of an entire 
community. The language of Hezbollah in the early 1980s reflected the environment of 
the time, and was a means to bring more actors into the fold. This argues against the 
often-misguided perception that armed resistance organizations are monolithic, dogmatic 
groups of ideologues. Foreign policy towards Hezbollah has often ignored the 
complicated, fractured nature of the group—that the members of resistance groups often 
have a myriad of differing interests. Terrorism, violence and radical political ideologies 
are all tactics, and to simply recite group statements and actions does little for true 
understanding. Those who seek to study violent organizations must find the root cause for 
group formation, no matter how repellent they view the organizations actions. Fear, anger 
and hatred of armed resistance groups often causes external actors to miss the nuance. 
Islamist parties are continually portrayed as groups of ideological zealots who are 
incapable of changing their stance. Hezbollah has not been immune from this 
characterization on the world stage. This representation has created an adversarial 
environment where many governments view their Islamist parties as an existential threat. 
As a result, repression has been the de facto tool of the state. Countless governments have 
used repression as their only option; imprisoning, killing and beating the members of 
these parties. While these tactics may have short-term success, they only serve to further 
radicalize resistance movements. Repression tactics have helped to create a more radical 
constituency and a spiraling cycle of violence that only seems to end with regime change 
or stalemate. Western leaders and the established governments of the Middle East have 




can occur through political participation. Political participation creates an environment 
that is advantageous to the emergence of moderates, and Hezbollah is a perfect example 
of this dynamic.158  
Political parties can only participate in the system when legitimized by a standing 
political authority.159 The Taif agreement of 1989 ended the 16-year civil war, and made 
the standing militias turn in their weapons, and create political parties. Furthermore, this 
agreement offered a greater proportion of seats to previously under represented religious 
confessions. The Maronite Christians no longer enjoyed the majority of seats within the 
Lebanese system. This agreement not only opened up political opportunity, but also 
legitimized Hezbollah’s use of violence. If Hezbollah participated in the political process, 
they would be allowed to continue their resistance against Israel in the south. This freed 
up resources that were being used internally, and allowed the more militant members of 
the organization to exercise their desire to fight. No longer were these energies to be used 
against domestic threats. Hezbollah was, in essence, rebranded as a nationalist resistance 
movement with certain Islamist principals.  
Inclusion theories show that political opportunity causes overall moderation of 
group activity.160 This is even more prevalent in democratic societies, since violence 
against the system becomes delegitimized. People do not see violence as a rational 
reaction to problems, because there is a peaceful outlet for political grievances. Radical 
members, those who want to use violence, leave the organization because they feel that 
their beliefs have been betrayed. It was political inclusion that completely undercut the 
legitimacy of Hezbollah’s previous radical message. The simple act of opening elections 
and seats to parliament caused a complete ideological shift in the organization within a 
year. The Lebanese government successfully influenced the debate from within the 
organization. No longer could Hezbollah call for the complete disillusionment of the 
government, since they were participating from within the system.  
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Ted Robert Gurr, a social scientist, examined terrorist organizations within 
democracies, and showed that these organizations have an expected shelf life.161 This 
piece dealt mainly with domestic organizations in the United States, but the lessons 
learned can also be applied to Hezbollah. Lebanon may not be the ideal model of 
democracy, but the Taif agreement of 1989 created greater opportunity to previously 
disenfranchised confessions. This made the democratic process the legitimate means to 
create change within the government, and delegitimized violence within the national 
borders. Hezbollah reacted in a similar fashion to the domestic terrorist organizations that 
were examined by Gurr. These organizations recognized the shrinking radical 
constituency and shifted ideologies, or ceased to replicate newer members. I argue that 
these inclusion theories help explain the moderation of Hezbollah’s rhetoric and tactics, 
and the creation of an environment that was advantageous to the creation of a political 
program. 
Hezbollah’s decision to participate in elections demonstrates a level of 
sophistication, pragmatism and self-awareness that older analytical models do not 
explain. These older theories ignore the underlying dynamics that cause people to support 
these violent organizations. Earlier social movement theories tend to underestimate the 
rationality and intelligence of the members of resistance organizations, and place too 
much emphasis on the role of charismatic leadership. These models also assumed that 
actors in resistance organizations are slaves to their emotions, and that the leader of a 
movement takes advantage of these emotions for their own social and political goals.162 
The institutional model also assumes that armed resistance organizations are wholly 
dependent on violence for their continued existence, and that any change to the  
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organizational tactics would spell the end of the movement as a whole. 163 When applied 
to Hezbollah, this approach simply does not fit. When domestic violence ceased to be a 
viable tactic, the group shifted policies. 
The organizational approach to the study of armed resistance organizations offers 
the best explanation behind the ideological shift in Hezbollah’s political program. This 
approach assumes that terrorism and violence were simply part of the repertoire of 
Hezbollah, and these tactics do not necessarily define the organization.164 The debate 
within Hezbollah’s leadership demonstrates their willingness to change organizational 
tactics in the face of new challenges. The decision to participate in elections did not spell 
the end of Hezbollah as an entity, because they were not simply defined by their previous 
radical political ideology. There was a multitude of different voices within the 
organization that fought over the ends desired and means employed. The decision to 
participate in parliamentary elections was not the result of a protracted external campaign 
against the organization. Israel, the other militias, and the west did not force a political 
change with violence. Hezbollah sought to maintain a strong constituency. The end of the 
civil war created an identity crisis for the organization as a whole. The disbandment of 
militias and the formation of political parties delegitimized the use of violence within 
Lebanon itself. As a result, Hezbollah’s leadership had to readjust tactics as a means of 
coopting a greater number of moderate constituents.  
As stated in the previous chapters, Hezbollah does not exist in singularity. The 
group consists of a large amount of constituents with different individual goals and, as 
such, it follows the same trends as other social movements. In the 1980s, the creation of a 
radical Islamist ideology was the result of the size of the organization, the environment, 
and the failures of previous efforts. Organizations that do not possess a large number of 
followers often use violent tactics as a means to legitimize their organization, and 
Hezbollah’s previous radical ideology reflected this dynamic.165 Violence and radical  
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language were the means to legitimize the organization in the short term. I argue that 
Hezbollah’s radical Islamist ideology was less important to the leadership than overall 
party survival.  
This study most importantly demonstrates the options available to external policy 
makers. When violent organizations are not taken at face value—when their true goals 
are exposed—then it becomes easier to create policy that deals with the underlying 
issues. For years the Shi’a community was underrepresented, underdeveloped, and 
marginalized in Lebanon. Hezbollah sought to gain a larger share of political power in 
Lebanon in order to create a more equitable share of government power and resources. 
The civil war forced Hezbollah to enter a political arena that threatened the very 
existence of not only the party, but the community itself. When the political climate 
adjusted, Hezbollah still sought to increase the Shi’a community’s share of political 
power, but could do so from within the bounds of parliamentary elections. A more 
pragmatic external approach would be to simply understand the underlying grievances at 
stake, and target those concerns. More often than not, external actors simply view radical 
ideology at face value, and then use tactics that harm their overall goals. In short, when 
external actors make violence the only means to create political change, they contribute 
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